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Abstract: In this article we assess income inequality across French and British 
colonial empires between 1920 and 1960. For the first time, income tax 
tabulations are exploited to assess the case studies of French Algeria, Tunisia, 
Cameroon, and Vietnam, which we compare to British colonies and dominions. 
As measured by top income shares, inequality was high in colonies. It fell after 
WWII, but stabilized at much higher levels than in mainland France or the 
United Kingdom in the 1950s. European settlers or expatriates comprised the 
bulk of top income earners, and only a minority of autochthons could compete 
in terms of income, particularly in Africa. Top income shares were no higher in 
settlement colonies, not only because those territories were wealthier but also 
because the average European settler was less rich than the average European 
expatriate. Inequality between Europeans in colonies was similar to (or even 
below) that of the metropoles. In settlement colonies, the post-WWII fall in 
income inequality can be explained by a fall in inequality between Europeans, 
mirroring that of the metropoles, and does not imply that the 
European/autochthon income gap was reduced. 
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Almost by definition, colonial societies entailed huge inequalities in political power and agency, as 
well as in social and economic opportunities, if only along the racial divide between European 
and autochthonous populations. The day-to-day experience of colonized peoples is well known; 
from very early on, the various forms of domination and discrimination were exposed through 
militant pamphlets, analytical essays, and sociological works.1,2 In contrast, the within-group 
inequalities of both the colonizers and the colonized have received little attention. On European 
settlers or expatriates, recent historical works have described opportunities offered by the 
colonial context (Lambert 2009; Chambru & Viallet-Thévenin 2019; Michel 2019). However, 
success stories are only part of the picture, and not all Europeans managed to find their way into 
the elite. Regarding autochthons, while some chiefs, landlords, religious leaders or scholars 
opposed colonial domination and were wiped out, others entered into various forms of 
collaboration with colonial authorities and were able to reap political and economic benefits. 
Furthermore –and despite colonial discrimination-, commerce, urbanization, and education 
opened new channels for accumulation and upward mobility, and also produced some of the 
soon-to-be leaders of the independence era (Chater 1993; Sraieb 1993; Brocheux & Hémery 
1994; Pervillé 1997; Bezançon 2002; 2002).3 Colonial societies also included autochthonous or 
immigrant minorities, such as Jews in North Africa, Levantines in West Africa, Indians in East 
Africa, or Chinese in Indochina, who played an important role in trade, and who were able to 
occupy intermediate positions within the income and wealth distributions. In any case, the 
current picture of colonial inequality is incomplete. 
 
As far as the quantitative evidence is concerned, little is known about income and wealth 
concentration in colonial societies, especially from a comparative standpoint, and particularly for 
Africa. How great was economic inequality in the colonies of the 20th century, and how did it 
compare to other historical cases? Could autochthonous elites compete with the richest 
Europeans in terms of economic affluence, and how high was inequality among the colonized, 
including non-European minorities? Was inequality higher where Europeans were many? Were 
the European enclaves homogeneous or not? How did the richest Europeans in the colonies 
compare with the richest in the mainland? As inequality fell in Europe following World War II, 
and colonialism became increasingly scrutinized for the treatment of its subjects, did inequality 
also decrease in the colonies, and why? This paper contributes to answering these questions by 
studying the concentration of income in four French colonies across Africa and Asia, and 
comparing them to those of the British Empire. Knowing more about colonial inequality is 
essential to better understanding the political economy of colonialism itself. It is also important 
for understanding the socioeconomic structures that the newly independent nations inherited 
with the end of the colonial rule, hence the political economy of the postcolonial era. In terms of 
inequality, colonial legacies varied depending on whether settlers left (Algeria) or stayed (South 
Africa). Furthermore, the ideological pathways chosen by newly independent nations ranged 
																																								 																				
1	Among the earliest works in the French colonial context, Nguyen Ai Quoc (1925) belongs to the first category, 
Franz Fanon (1952) and Albert Memmi (1957) to the second, and Georges Balandier (1955) and Pierre Bourdieu 
(1958) to the third.	
2	The fate of mixed-race individuals also well demonstrates the difficulty of bridging the divide between colonizer 
and colonized (White 1999; Saada 2012).	
3	Here again, the cited references are restricted to French colonies.	
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from Marxism-Leninism (North Vietnam, and later the whole of Vietnam), to ‘planned’ or 
‘community’ liberalism (doctrines of the two successive presidents of independent Cameroon), to 
variations of socialism (Algeria, Tunisia, India) that were later either abandoned or amended. 
Despite their diversity, what these doctrines had in common was an objective to reduce inequality 
by breaking with colonial structures. 
 
Until recently, studies on colonial inequality have focused on the distribution of the populations 
across social classes, each of which is associated with an estimate of average income; today, this 
construct is known as a “social table”. In a seminal work on French North Africa, Samir Amin 
estimates the average income of Muslims and non-Muslims in agricultural and non-agricultural 
occupations in 1955, at the end of the colonial period (1970, pp. 60-89).4 Bigsten (1986) 
disaggregates national income in Kenya from 1914-1976 into 13 occupational groups; having 
estimated income inequality within each group for a given date, he assumes the within 
components to be time-invariant and produces a time series for the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality. He finds that the Gini coefficient increases sharply between 1914 and 1950, from 0.50 
to 0.70, following the urban-rural income gap, and then fluctuates between 0.60 and 0.70 in the 
1950s and 1960s. Bolt and Hillbom (2016) use the same method to study income inequality in 
Botswana from 1921 to 1974; they find a regular increase in the income Gini from the mid-1930s 
to the mid-1970s, followed by stagnation at a very high level. Aboagye and Bolt (2018) construct 
social tables for Ghana between 1891 and 1960, and also find an increase in the Gini coefficient 
between 1930 and 1960. In contrast, Alfani and Tadei (2017) look at Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal, 
two French colonies in West Africa, and find a significant decrease in the Gini and Theil 
coefficients between 1939 and 1954, which they link to the reduction of inequality between 
Europeans and autochthons. Milanovic, Lindert, and Williamson (2011) use social tables to 
estimate Gini coefficients for 28 pre-industrial societies, including New Spain (1790) and 
precolonial (1750) and colonial (1947) India.5 Milanovic (2018) adds 13 social tables to this 
database, including one from Sarah Merette (2013a, b) on colonial Southern (Cochinchina) and 
Northern (Tonkin) Vietnam in 1929. The social table approach entails a number of limitations. 
First, the method is mostly based on labor earnings linked to occupations, and often ignores (or 
fails to capture) other relevant sources of income (rents, profits).6 Second, inequality within 
occupational groups can be severe, and can change across time. Third, the contents of each 
occupation may vary across space and time. 
 
Fiscal sources allow for a more direct approach that can complement social tables and address 
some of the drawbacks of missing survey data. After World War I, Britain and France gradually 
introduced progressive personal income taxes in their colonial empires, shortly after the 
enactment of these taxes in the metropolis.7 In recent work, Atkinson (2014, 2015a, b, c) 
																																								 																				
4 See Appendix Table C1. Ageron (2005) discusses Amin’s figures for Algeria, and points to large uncertainties. 
5 On the basis of these estimates, Williamson (2010, 2015) contradicts Engerman and Sokoloff (2000), arguing that 
inequality in Spanish and Portuguese America was moderate and that it rather rose long after independence, 
following the first wave of globalization in the late 19th century. 	
6 Frankema (2010) analyzes the colonial origins of land inequality in Malaysia, Sierra Leone and Zambia. 
7	Even if this work is related to the latest developments in the study of top incomes (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 
2010; Alvaredo et al., 2013), it is worth recalling that this area of literature has long been concerned with the colonial 
territories: Frankel and Herzfeld (1943) published estimates of the European income distribution in South Africa 
based on the income tax returns by making use of control totals from the population census and from the national 
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exploited income tax data for former British territories in Central, West and East Africa. Here, 
we use income tax distributional tables published in French statistical abstracts to estimate and 
analyze the shares accruing to top income groups across four French colonial territories, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Vietnam, and Cameroon, between 1920 and 1960. We then compare the data to British 
colonies and former dominions in Africa and Asia (Atkinson 2014, 2015a, b, c; Alvaredo and 
Atkinson 2010; Alvaredo, Bergeron and Cassan 2017, Banerjee and Piketty, 2010), as well as with 
France or the United Kingdom (Atkinson 2005, 2007b; Piketty 2001, 2007). No data source is 
perfect, and this approach is not exempt from shortcomings. We discuss, in particular, a number 
of methodological limitations: sensitivity to population and income aggregates, coverage and 
enforcement of the income tax, and definitions of income. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 provide a preview of the main results. Unsurprisingly, we find that top income 
inequality in the French and British empires of the 20th century was high. Although it fell 
significantly after World War II, as it did in mainland France or United-Kingdom, it stabilized in 
the 1950s at higher levels than in the metropoles. Although non-Europeans were sometimes 
present at the top of the income distribution, this was rarely the case in Africa. In Tunisia, non-
Europeans, including the Jewish minority, could represent up to 20% of top income earners; in 
South Vietnam, non-Europeans, including the Chinese minority, could reach up to 30 to 40% of 
the top income group. European settlers or expatriates always made up the majority of top 
income recipients, to a greater extent in Africa. Despite being wealthier, the top income shares of 
settlement colonies were no higher than in colonies where the number of European expatriates 
was far smaller. This was because in non-settlement colonies the top rich expatriates were more 
exclusive or received higher bonuses than settlers did. Inequality between Europeans must have 
been close to, or even lower than, inequality in the mainland of origin. We show that in the 
settlement colonies of South Africa, Algeria, or Zimbabwe, the post-war fall in colonial inequality 
can be explained by the fall of inequality between Europeans alone, which mirrored that of 
mainland Europe, and cannot be taken to imply that the income gap between Europeans and 
autochthons decreased.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical 
background for the four French colonies, along with a description of the various forms of 
income taxes that were implemented after WWI. Section 3 presents the income distribution data 
and estimation methodology. Section 4 describes our estimates of the population of tax units and 
of the total (fiscal) reference income. Section 5 presents the results, with details on wealthy 
autochthons, European settlers and expatriates, and an analysis of the evolution of inequality 
before and after World War II. Section 6 concludes. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
accounts; their use of external information to complement income tax data pre-dates Kuznets’ study of upper 
income groups in the US by ten years (1953).	
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Figure 1. Top 1% income share in the French and British colonial empires, 1920-1960 
 
Sources: Table 2A (Algeria), Table 2B (Tunisia), Table 2D (Indochina), Piketty, 2001, 2007 (France), Atkinson, 2005, 
2007a (UK), Alvaredo and Atkinson, 2010 (South Africa), Banerjee and Piketty, 2010 and Alvaredo, Bergeron and 
Cassan, 2017 (India). 
 
 
Figure 2. Top 0.1% income share in the French and British colonial empires, 1920-1960 
 
	
Sources: Table 2A (Algeria), Table 2B (Tunisia), Table 2C (French Cameroon), Table 2D (Vietnam), Piketty 2001, 
2007 (France), Atkinson 2005, 2007a (UK), Alvaredo and Atkinson 2010 (South Africa), Banerjee and Piketty, 2010 
and Alvaredo, Bergeron and Cassan 2017 (India), Atkinson 2015b, (Zambia and Zimbabwe). 
6 
	
2. Historical background and chronology of tax reforms  
 
Algeria. Before the French invasion of 1830, Algeria was part of the Ottoman Empire. It was 
officially annexed by France in 1848 and divided into three départements, although conquest wars 
would continue for the next four decades, the last major insurrection being that of the Kabylie 
province in 1871. French and other European populations (Spanish, Italian) more than doubled 
between 1871 and 1914. The Jews of Algeria were granted French citizenship in 1871. With the 
advent of the Third Republic, settlers’ opposition to the military administration gained 
momentum, and by 1900 they obtained some autonomy in government. In 1932, where our 
income tax data series on Algeria begins, non-Muslims accounted for 13.5% of the population 
(14.4% of tax units, given the differences in age, structure, and household composition between 
Europeans and Muslims).8 After the mid-1930s, the share of non-Muslims began to slowly 
decrease until it reached 10% in 1961. After the end of the independence war, in 1962, almost all 
French pied-noirs (settlers) and Jews left Algeria. Settlers made up the majority of the urban 
population, and in agriculture they produced wine and grew wheat and barley, oranges, lemons, 
and olives. Oil and gas production only became significant at the very end of the colonial period. 
After WWI, tax obligations made no distinction between French or European citizens and from 
Algerian “Muslims” as colonial subjects. The impôt complémentaire sur le revenu was set as early as in 
1920, soon after the introduction of the income tax in mainland France in 1914. It came on top 
of other schedular taxes on salaries, profits, and rental income. The income tax also came to 
replace the old impôts arabes (Arab taxes) that had survived from the Ottoman period and were 
abandoned in 1919.9 Published income tax tables make no distinction between Muslim and non-
Muslim taxpayers.10 Available distributional data cover the years from 1932 to 1957 (1942-1945 
are missing).11 
 
Tunisia. France conquered Tunisia (also formerly part of the Ottoman Empire) in 1881. It 
remained a protectorate, under the official rule of the bey of Tunis, even if the actual power was 
exerted by the résident général de France and the French administration. French and Italian 
immigrants trickled in until WWI, by which point Europeans made up 7% of the population. 
Most of them gradually left the country in the decade that followed independence in 1956. In 
1947, when our income tax data begins, Europeans represented 7.3% of population, of which 
61% were French and 34% Italian (8.8% of tax units).12 By 1956, the year of the country’s 
independence, this share had decreased to 6.7%. In contrast with Algeria, Jews were not granted 
French citizenship and were counted as “Tunisians” in official statistics; they represented 1.5% of 
the population in 1955, hence 18% of “non-Muslims.” The Jewish population left Tunisia after 
independence, half of them to Israel, and the other half to France. As in Algeria, settlers 
produced wine and grew wheat, oranges, lemons, and olives in the outskirts of the cities. The 
personal income tax, called the contribution personnelle d’État, was established in 1928. It began as a 
very simple tax with five income ranges (a lump-sum corresponding to each range) on the 
																																								 																				
8 See Appendix Table B1.A, column (9). 
9 The achour and the hokkor (only in Constantine area) were taxes on agricultural land, the zekkat was a tax on cattle, 
the lezma only prevailed in Kabylie and was a head tax with three distinct rates according to estimated wealth.  
10 Until 1938, the income tax was only levied in Northern Algeria, where more than 90% of the population lived. 
11	Dates correspond to the year when incomes were earned, given that the income tax was levied the year after.	
12	See Appendix Table B1.B, column (8).	
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resident population. Subsequently, it was transformed into a progressive income tax in 1937 with 
increasingly refined schedules as time went on. The tabulations from the income tax span from 
1946 to 1956 (1949-1951 are missing), and provide a breakdown of European and Tunisian 
income recipients.  
 
French Cameroon. French Cameroon resulted from the partition of the German colony of 
Kamerun between the British and the French at the end of WWI. In 1920, about three quarters 
of the territory was placed under French rule as part of a mandate from the League of Nations. 
The remainder from the border of present-day Nigeria was placed under British rule. By 1946, 
the French population was still very small, and did not count more than 4,000 people -a little 
over 0.1% of the total. Independence came in 1960. French colonists established plantations for 
palm oil, bananas, and groundnuts. Coffee, cocoa, and rubber only arrived in the late 1950s, and 
oil production at the end of the 1970s. The impôt global sur le revenu was introduced in French 
Cameroon in 1937 and applied to all residents. For eligible taxpayers with incomes above the 
given threshold, it replaced the head tax. There were two versions of the tax, one for Europeans 
and the other for Africans.13 The European income tax was truly progressive, while the African 
version was a lump-sum tax whose amount depended on income. In 1945, the same system still 
applied: Europeans were subject to the impôt général sur le revenu, while relatively rich Africans had 
the impôt personnel nominatif par tranche de revenu. The Annuaire Statistique du Cameroun 1938-1945 
provides two separate income tabulations for Africans and Europeans for incomes accrued in 
1945.  This is the only year for which we have been able to locate income distribution statistics. 
 
Indochina / Vietnam. French Indochina was composed of five territories that were gradually 
conquered by France between 1858 and 1899. Cochinchina (Southern Vietnam, capital city 
Saigon) was the first, in 1862, and was directly ruled as a colony. The other four, Annam (Central 
Vietnam, capital city Hue), Tonkin (North Vietnam, capital city Hanoi), Cambodia (capital city 
Phnom Penh), and Laos (capital city Vientiane), were officially registered as protectorates, 
although Tonkin was eventually managed as a colony. The gouvernement général of Indochina was 
established in 1897, putting the five territories under a federal administration. Europeans living 
across these territories were mostly French (constituting 95% of the total European population) 
and counted some 20,000 people in 1920, and a little less than 50,000 at the beginning of the 
1940s. In 1920, half of this total resided in Cochinchina, which rose to two-thirds by 1948. Most 
of the remainder were based in Tonkin, and never represented more than 0.25% of the 
population. Chinese people constituted a larger minority, counting around 300,000 people in 
1920 and over 600,000 in 1948 (over 2% of the population). After a short-lived invasion by the 
Japanese at the end of WWII, the French lost ground and were unable to regain control over the 
North. In 1947, partial autonomy was granted to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, with Vietnam 
still divided into three regions (South, Central, and North). The war for Indochina ended with the 
French defeat of Dien-Bien-Phu in 1954. The French had invested in rice production and 
exports, rubber, tea and coffee plantations, and exploited coal and tin mineral resources. The taxe 
personnelle sur les européens et assimilés was enforced in 1920 in all of Indochina and applied only to 
																																								 																				
13 According to public finance accounts (Cogneau, Dupraz & Mesplé-Somps 2018), the income tax was introduced 
in 1934 in French Central Africa (Afrique Equatoriale Française) and French Western Africa (Afrique Occidentale 
Française), apart from Côte d’Ivoire, where it was installed in 1937, Togo in 1943, and Madagascar in 1946. 
Unfortunately, we have not been able to find any statistics for these colonies. 
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Europeans, Westerners, and the Japanese. It was a lump-sum which increased over twelve ranges 
of income. The implicit rates were very low. The tax was later replaced by the impôt général sur le 
revenu, which applied to all households whose income lay above a relatively high threshold. The 
latter was first implemented in Cochinchina and Cambodia in 1937. It then reached Laos and 
Annam in 1938, and finally Tonkin in 1940; however, in these three territories only Europeans, 
Chinese and other Asians were liable, while Indochinese households were exempt. In 
Cochinchina and Tonkin, tabulations from statistical annals distinguish Europeans, Chinese, 
Asian foreigners, and Indochinese (the latter only in Cochinchina).14 As we lack estimates for 
Cambodia and Laos’ domestic income, we focus on Vietnam (i.e. the reunion of Cochinchina, 
Annam and Tonkin), and only report estimates for the two other colonies in the Appendix.  
 
British colonies and dominions. Our main focus is not the colonial history, economic 
structure, or the income taxation features of the colonies, territories, and dominions of the 
British Empire included in our comparison; rather, we borrow results from a number of authors. 
In alphabetical order we consider: Ghana (former Gold Coast), India (British India then 
independent India without Pakistan), Kenya, Malawi (former Nyasaland), Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanganyika (mainland part of Tanzania, merged with Zanzibar island in 1964), Uganda, Zambia 
(former Northern Rhodesia) and Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia). The interested reader is 
referred to the papers of Atkinson on the British colonies in Africa (Atkinson 2014, 2015a, b, c), 
to Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010) on South Africa, and to Banerjee and Piketty (2010) and 
Alvaredo, Bergeron and Cassan (2017) on India. Each had its particular political arrangements, 
and not all remained strict colonies for the duration of the period under analysis. The Union of 
South Africa was a British dominion formed in 1910, and was made up of the former colonies of 
the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange River Colony (or Free State) and Transvaal, and was 
transformed into a republic in 1961, before eventually leaving the Commonwealth; as is well 
known, the rule of the white minority only ended in 1994. India became independent in 1947. 
Following Ghana in 1957, all other British colonies gained their independence after 1960. 
Southern Rhodesia declared unilateral independence from Britain in order to preserve the white 
minority rule, which only came to an end with the creation of Zimbabwe in 1980. For our 
purposes, it is enough to say a final word on European settlement patterns. White settlers 
represented around 20% of the population of South Africa from the beginning of the 20th 
century until 1960, after which their population share decreased. Zambia and Zimbabwe, at the 
time respectively Northern and Southern Rhodesia, were settlement colonies like South Africa, 
although to a lesser extent, as Europeans never constituted more than 4% of the total population 
in the former, and never more than 7.5% in the latter; these fractions increased significantly in 
the 1950s. Kenya was another intermediate case, with the population of white settlers at around 
0.6% in 1948. In other African colonies, Europeans did not make up more than 0.15% of the 
populations, like in Cameroon (but also Vietnam). In Eastern Africa, a significant Indian minority 
could also be found (such as in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika). In all African colonies, except 
for South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the majority of white settlers left the country after 
independence; many white Zimbabweans also left after the end of the white rule in 1980. Last, in 
India, Europeans represented an even smaller proportion of the population, less than 0.05%. 
																																								 																				
14	See the top panel of Appendix A1.E for population coverage. Again, dates correspond to the year when incomes 
were earned; the true date of implementation is the year after.	
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3. Income tax data and estimation methods 
 
The data used here do not come in the form of individual tax records, which no longer exist for 
the period studied; rather, we make use of readily published tabulations. The information 
necessary for the estimation of top income shares is the distribution of taxpayers assessed by 
ranges of income and, ideally the amount of income in each range (present in many, but not all 
cases). The tabulations categorize taxpayers by income ranges 𝑦!;  𝑦!!! ; for each income range 
they report the number of taxpayers 𝑁!  and the total income before tax 𝑌! , as exemplified in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  The typical income tax tabulation 
Income brackets Total number of taxpayers Total income declared 
Between 𝑦! and 𝑦! 𝑁! 𝑌! 
… … … 
Between 𝑦! and 𝑦!!! 𝑁! 𝑌! 
… … … 
Above 𝑦!  𝑁! 𝑌! 
 
With the total number of potential tax units, N (assuming everyone was required to file for the 
income tax, i.e. including those who lay below the minimum income tax threshold), we can 
calculate the cumulated population share lying above the lower bound of each income 
bracket: 𝑃! = 𝑁!!!! 𝑁, for tax payers whose pre-tax income lies above 𝑦! . In addition, if we 
know the (before tax) total household income, Y, we are also able to estimate the income share 
earned by people lying above 𝑦! : 𝑆! = 𝑌!!!! 𝑌. Pareto interpolation techniques allow us to 
estimate 𝑆! , the income share earned by the q richest percent, for any q lying below 𝑃!.15 In this 
paper, we apply the mean-split histogram method (Atkinson, 2005, 2007b). When the coverage of 
the income tax is low, we can only estimate the shares of the very rich groups (the top 1% or the 
top 0.1%).  
 
For some years, income tax tabulations only report the number of taxpayers and not their total 
declared income: Algeria 1932-1941 and 1946, Tunisia 1956, and for Vietnamese colonies 
following the introduction of the income tax.16 We impute total declared income to each 
bracket.17 The simplest solution can be applied to cases where the income records are available 
for the previous or next year with the same income brackets; we then import the average income 
from the year with no missing income totals: Algeria 1946, using 1947; Tunisia 1956, using 1955; 
and Tonkin 1921, using 1922. A second and relatively easy case is that of Vietnam, where we still 
have access to the total amount of taxable income of liable taxpayers. Under the general income 
tax, the total amount of incomes sitting above the liability threshold 𝑦! (=3600 piasters) is 
																																								 																				
15 Readers interested in the details of the estimation methods are referred to Atkinson (2007b), Cowell (2011), and 
Blanchet, Fournier, and Piketty (2017). 
16 See bottom panel of Appendix Table A1.E. 
17 See Appendix A1.F. 
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reported.18 This is good because liable taxpayers make up just over 0.1% of fiscal units, so that 
the estimate of the 0.1% income share is anchored on this known amount and does not depend 
much on our imputations (although lower top percentile shares do). For each bracket, we write: 
𝑌! = 𝑁! 𝑦! + 𝛼 𝑦!!! − 𝑦!  for k=0, …, K, while setting  𝑦! = 0 and 𝑦!!! = 2𝑦! .19 The 
parameter 𝛼 is then calibrated to fit the reported total amount. In Algeria 1932-1941, where the 
total of taxable incomes is not even available, we assume that the mean income exceeds the lower 
bound of the bracket by 30% of the bracket range, and by 30% of  𝑦! in the last bracket.20 
 
In the early years of Vietnamese colonies, before the introduction of the general income tax, 
incomes declared in the last bracket are obviously capped; indeed, as the tax is a lump-sum tax 
based on the brackets, it is not necessary to know the exact figure of incomes above the last 
threshold, as they are in any case subject to the maximum lump-sum tax. We use the ratio 
(1+ 𝛼) to 𝑦! for 1937 and 1938. This is innocuous for the estimate of the 0.1% income share 
(but not for the 0.01%), as taxpayers in the last bracket never represent more than 0.006% of 
fiscal units. 
 
Once all imputations are implemented separately, we aggregate the income tabulations of the 
three Vietnamese colonies into one, and estimate the top shares for Vietnam as a whole (1921 to 
1942). In Appendix Figure D2 we also provide separate figures for Cochinchina, Annam, and 
Tonkin, while data for Cochinchina (South-Vietnam) extends beyond World War II, until 1949. 
 
In Algeria, until 1945, lump-sum deductions for family charges applied, and reported income was 
net of these deductions. Before 1937, only the number of children under 18 years old mattered. 
Starting in 1938, deduction schedules changed somewhat: married couples benefited from an 
initial deduction even in the absence of children, and the total deduction was modulated 
according to the level of declared income. These deductions mechanically generate an 
underestimation of the top income shares. As household composition is most likely correlated 
with income, it is very difficult to implement a refined correction. We can still compute a coarse 
estimate for the resulting underestimation. We used population census data for Algeria in 1948 to 
estimate the distribution of family types (married couples or single parents according to the 
number of children). Two separate distributions were produced for non-Muslims and Muslims. 
We then calculated the average deduction that would have applied to each year, assuming that the 
household composition of taxpayers was the same as in a population composed of 90% of the 
average non-Muslim household and 10% of the average Muslim household (while ignoring the 
decrease in deductions with declared income, which is conservative).21 Under these assumptions, 
																																								 																				
18	In all years, the total number of registered European tax units is also reported, even below the liability threshold; 
this is why the first income bracket 0;  y!  is not empty. In 1940, the reported taxable income total includes the 
income of these non-liable Europeans. See Appendix A1.F.	
19	The latter y!!! = 2y! is arbitrary, yet it results in rather plausible estimates of α, which make the average income 
in the last unbounded income bracket exceed y! by 23 to 72%, depending on the colony and the year considered.	
20	The latter assumption is innocuous for the estimates of the 1% or 0.1% income shares, as the last open bracket 
never represents more than 0.004% of tax units, and always less than 0.002% after 1934.	
21	This 90/10 weighing rule is motivated by the case of Tunisia where the breakdown of taxpayers by citizenship is 
reported. In Tunisia after WWII, around 20% of liable taxpayers are not Europeans, yet some of them are Jews. This 
is why we consider that only 10% of taxpayers were Muslim before WWII. Given the differences in household 
structure and the deductions schedule, assuming 0% or 20% of Muslims makes very little change.	
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the top 1% income share could be underestimated by 2.5 to 3.5 percentage points in the years 
1932 to 1941. This would shift Algeria in the 1930s to above South Africa (Figure 1), and the fall 
of the top income share after WWII would look even sharper. Given that deductions are lump-
sum amounts, their impact on the 0.1% top income share is negligible (one tenth of the 
calculated impact on the 1% share in percentage points). 
 
To summarize, we believe that the impact of taxable income imputations, corrections for capped 
incomes, and deductions for family charges should be limited, both for the top 1% and top 0.1% 
income shares estimates on the total population. They could have more impact on the estimates 
of the within-group distributions (Europeans and non-Europeans); this source of uncertainty will 
be given due consideration in the analytical section. 
 
4. Total population and income 
 
In order to arrive at meaningful inequality estimates, the distribution of taxpayers by income 
ranges have to be combined with totals for the number of households N, and for household 
income Y. The income tax data can only be interpreted in the light of such external information. 
The assembly of this information for much of the first half of the twentieth century in the 
colonial territories requires a considerable investment, and further elements of uncertainty. As 
also stressed in Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010), an understanding of these processes is necessary 
to appreciate the limitations of the estimates, but may also provide confidence in their use. The 
next two sub-sections explain our estimates for the population total, as well as for total 
household income. 
 
4.1 Population of tax units 
 
In the four French colonies being studied, the income tax was originally levied on the tax unit, as 
in most countries, treating single adults and married couples as units. This is still the case in 
France today (and in the UK until 1989). Our income shares are consequently defined with 
respect to the population of tax units. In principle, the derivation of these numbers involves the 
following steps: (1) estimate of total population, (2) exclusion of those aged under 15, to arrive at 
the number of adults, and (3) subtraction of the number of married women to arrive at a total for 
tax units. The selection of the age of 15 is arbitrary but does not seem unreasonable, and follows 
common practice within the literature.  
 
In this paper, due to the limitations of the available statistics, we will simply calculate the number 
of tax units as 60% of the population aged 15 and over. This method was chosen according to 
the data that was available, but also for the purpose of comparing our results with those of 
Atkinson (2014; 2015a, b, c), who made the same choice when analyzing British colonies. In the 
case of Algeria, and for Europeans in Indochina, we can confirm that this option is consistent 
with a more refined analysis of demographic structures, as we detail below.22 
 
																																								 																				
22 The series of the control totals for population and income are given in Appendix Table B1.A (Algeria), Table B1.B 




Algeria. The total numbers of “Muslims” and “non-Muslims” are drawn from population 
censuses of 1931, 1936, 1948, and 1954 (Annuaire Statistique de l’Algérie, 1955). A population 
estimate for 1960 is taken from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1966. The 
number of non-Muslims is drawn from the Annuaire Statistique de la France for 1962. These figures 
were double-checked with demographic studies from CICRED (1974a), and from Fargues 
(1986). Starting with 1931, demographers deem population censuses reliable enough. Age 
pyramids are available for the population censuses of 1936, 1948 and 1954. We use them to 
estimate the total population aged 15 and over, separately for Muslims and non-Muslims. We 
assume that the 1936 age structure applies to 1931, and that the 1954 age structure applies to 
1960. Between census years, population figures are interpolated with constant annual growth 
rates. 
Using the 1948 population census, we first estimate the number of tax units for 1948 as the sum 
of married men aged 15 and over, widowed and divorced men and women aged 15-69, single 
men and women aged 30-69, 80% of single men and women aged 25-29, 50% of single men and 
women aged 20-24, 20% of single men and women aged 15-19, and 50% of single men and 
women over 70.23 For Europeans, the figure obtained represents 58% of the adult population, 
close to the 60% figure used by Atkinson (2014; 2015a, b, c). For Muslims, it reaches 54%. For 
the sake of simplicity and comparison with existing estimates for the British Empire, we still take 
60% of the population aged over 15 as the number of tax units, as mentioned above. 
 
Tunisia. The total numbers of Europeans and Tunisians (including Jews) are drawn from 
population census of 1946 and 1956, corrected by CICRED (1974b). To obtain the number of 
people aged 15 and over, we use the age pyramids also found in the censuses. We then apply the 
same ratio as in Algeria (60%) to arrive at the number of tax units in the European and Tunisian 
populations, respectively. 
 
French Cameroon. For the population of Cameroon in 1945, we take the estimate from 
Frankema and Jerven (2014), as colonial enumerations severely underestimate the total 
population, and are inconsistent with post-independence census figures. To calculate the 
population of the French region, we apply a ratio of 85% to account for the fact that the 
Southern part of British Cameroon merged with French Cameroon to form present-day 
Cameroon. The enumeration for 1945, as reported in the Annuaire Statistique du Cameroun 1938-
1945 (vol. 1), points to a proportion of 65% of people aged 15 and over. As this kind of 
enumerations tend to leave out a significant portion of children, the share is likely to be 
overstated. In 1948 Algeria, this share represents 57% for Muslims. We prefer to apply Algeria’s 
proportion for the population aged 15 and over, and then take 60% of those over 15 as our total 
population of tax units. 
Indochina / Vietnam. Both the total population and the population of over 15-year-olds in 
each of the five colonies of Indochina are from Banens (2000). We again take 60% of the 15 and 
over population as an estimate of the total number of tax units. The population of Europeans is 
available for the years 1921, 1929, 1931, 1936, 1937 (all of which were specific censuses specific 
for Europeans), 1947, and 1948.  We are also able to estimate the number of European soldiers, 
																																								 																				
23	The shares for single individuals according to age are chosen rather arbitrarily.	
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who always made up at least 20% of the European population, although from 1947 this rose to at 
least 50%. The majority of the members of the armed forces were exempt from income taxes. 
Once again, taking 60% of the number of Europeans aged 15 and over is therefore well suited to 
estimating the total number of Europeans in civilian employment, for both 1929 and 1937. 
 
Figure 3. Income taxpayers as a percentage of total tax units, 1920-1960 
 
 
Sources: Appendix Tables B1.A-B1.D, and Appendix A2. 
 
Figure 3 displays the number of income tax payers covered by the published statistics as a 
proportion of the number of total tax units, whose estimation we have just described. While in 
Algeria and Tunisia income taxpayers represented over 2% of tax units, in Cameroon they made 
up only 0.9%, and in Vietnam just slightly more than 0.1%. These figures fix bounds to the top 
income groups that we are able to study in each colony (𝑃!, as defined above). In North Africa, 
they point to quite significant variations in coverage. In Algeria, the share of taxpayers varies 
between 1.9 (for 1947) and 5% (for 1957), and in Tunisia ranges from 2.2% in 1946 to 4.4% in 
1956. These variations are mainly due to inflation and delayed adjustments of liability thresholds; 
the period of 1937-1949 is indeed characterized by high inflation, particularly between the years 
1946 and 1949.24 In Tunisia, during 1955 and 1956, the notable increase in coverage stems from 
the inclusion of more non-European taxpayers following independence in 1956 (given the one 





24	See Appendix Table B1.A column (15) and Appendix Table B1.B column (18).	
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4.2. Total income 
 
The tax records only cover a fraction of income, so we need to estimate control totals for 
aggregate income. As Atkinson points out “If the population totals pose problems, then control 
totals for household income take us into still more treacherous territory” (2014, p. 11). The 
difficulties in calculating national income in Africa are widely recognized, and there is much 
criticism of contemporary macro-economic statistics. Nonetheless, there is a long history of 
research on national accounts in Africa, specific to each of the countries that form the basis of 
our series. For the most part, we import the GDP and price data constructed by Cogneau, 
Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps (2018); the sources and methods for which are briefly described 
below.25 
 
Algeria.  Official national accounts are available from 1950. We extrapolate GDP backwards 
from 1950 to 1932, using Samir Amin’s estimate of the growth rate of real GDP between 1930 
and 1955 (1970, p.54).26 To obtain GDP in current francs, for years 1938 to 1957, we use the 
consumer price index of Algiers, and for years 1932 to 1938 we use the France price index from 
Villa (1994).27 We must then go from GDP to household (fiscal) income. In 1950s France, the 
gross primary income of households was around 85% of GDP, and household income was 
around 60% of gross primary income, due to important conceptual differences between the 
definition of income by national accounts and by the fiscal administration, in particular for non-
salaried occupations (Piketty 2018, Appendix G). In Algeria, households’ gross primary income 
also lies between 80 and 87% of GDP in 1950-1957, with a mean of 83% which matches the 
level at 1950, the base year for our backward projection.28 To calculate total household income 
we then apply a ratio of 0.83×0.60=0.50 to GDP. 
 
Tunisia. Estimates of GDP in constant francs are available for the years 1950 to 1961, as 
reported in Amin (1966), Zarka (1964) and the Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie (1955, 1959, 1960, 
and 1961-62). We grant our preference to Amin’s (1966) figures for 1953 (p. 297), 1955 (p. 101), 
and 1957 (p. 297). For 1953, Amin’s GDP is consistent with the Annuaire (1955), but 15% lower 
than Zarka’s. Amin’s figure for 1955 is 5% higher than Zarka’s, which means that 1953-1955 is a 
period of high growth (6.8% per year) according to the former, while GDP decreases according 
to the latter. Given the large public investments financed by loans at the end of the colonial 
period (Saul, 2016), Amin’s figures seem more likely. For 1957, the three estimates are very close; 
GDP falls down in the immediately following independence, and positive growth only resumes 
after 1958. We translate these estimates into current francs using the consumer price index of 




25	More details are provided in the data appendixes of this paper. Original sources are detailed in Appendix A3. 
26	Between 1930 and 1950, Cogneau, Dupraz, and Mesplé-Somps (2018) also make use of exports and imports data 
to estimate year-to-year GDP variation, see their data appendix.		
27	Between 1938 and 1957, the Pearson coefficient of correlation between the two indexes is 0.99.	
28 After 1954, large inflows of military soldiers, who are treated as residents in national accounts, tend to distort the 
representativeness of national income figures. The 1950s are also specific in that remittances (not included in GDP 
but included in household income) from Algerian migrants in France were already quite significant. For these 
reasons, taking 1950 as the base year is safer than taking an average of the 1950s. 
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French Cameroon. The GDP of the French part of Cameroon was estimated for the years 1947 
and 1953 by the French administration in charge of the overseas territories. From 1947 back to 
1945, we use Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps’ (2018) extrapolation, based on trade data. We 
translate the constant franc estimate to current prices using the consumer price index for 
Brazzaville (the capital city of French Congo, the nearest place where price data were collected 
between 1938 and 1951). We take 50% of GDP to obtain household income. 
Indochina / Vietnam. GDP estimates at current prices for the three parts of Vietnam between 
1920 and 1952 are from Jean-Pascal Bassino (2000), who generously shared his estimates with 
us.29 Using these estimates, we apply the ratio of 50% to obtain household income. 
Unfortunately, no GDP estimates were available for Cambodia and Laos. Even so, we still 
tentatively computed top income shares for these two colonies, by assuming that Cambodia and 
Laos had the same GDP per capita as Annam (Appendix Figure D6). 
Figure 4. Estimates of GDP per capita in Algeria, Tunisia, French Cameroon and 
Indochina, 1920-1960 
 
Sources: see text and Appendix A3. 
Notes: The purchasing power parity conversion factor has been constructed using a basket of goods for years 1936-
38. Compared to the reference country Algeria, prices are found to be lower by 5% in Tunisia, 20% in Cameroon, 
and 60% in Vietnam. See Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps (2018) (data appendix).  
 
Figure 4 displays the time profile of the real GDP per capita between 1920 and 1960, for the 
years when tax data are available. A number of comments are in order. In the first half of the 20th 
century, average incomes in Algeria and Tunisia are considerably higher than in the rest of the 
empire. In particular, Cameroon and Indochina were four to five times poorer than Algeria in 
terms of PPP.  
																																								 																				
29 We use the Saigon consumer price index of 1920-1940 for Southern Vietnam (Cochinchina) and Central Vietnam 
(Annam), and the Hanoi consumer price index for Northern Vietnam (Tonkin). 
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In Algeria, GDP per capita decreased by 20% between 1930 and 1950, corresponding to the 
Great Depression and World War II. Very high growth rates were achieved in the 1950s, despite 
the independence war which began in 1954. This can be attributed to the significant 
infrastructural investments financed by the metropolis, as well as to growth recovery in France 
which encouraged Algerian exports. In Tunisia, growth was also quite high between 1946 and 
independence in 1956. In Cameroon, GDP per capita showed no signs of change until 1946, 
when large public investments financed by grants began, so that the only point we observe is 
before this growth spell. In Indochina, GDP per capita stagnated in the 1920s; subsequently, the 
Great Depression resulted in a collapse of the international prices of rice and rubber, causing a 
deep deflationary crisis in the first half of the 1930s. Growth resumed in the second half, but 
GDP collapsed again during WWII. 
 
Figure 5 displays the ratios between the average incomes of the empire and mainland France. 
Before WWII, the metropole was three times richer than Algeria, and over ten times richer than 
Indochina (note that here, in contrast to Figure 4, the series are not adjusted for differences in 
price levels). After WWII, France experienced very high growth rates, increasing the gap with 
Algeria and Tunisia, which, despite their own growth processes, ended up four to five times 
poorer than France by the mid-1950s. 
 
Figure 5. Average income in Algeria, Tunisia, French Cameroon and Indochina: ratio to 
average income in France, 1920-1960 
 
Sources: Tables B1.A-B1.D and WID.world.  




5. Income concentration in the French and British colonial empires 
5.1. The income shares of the top 1% and 0.1% groups across time 
 
Table 2 presents our estimates of top income shares for Algeria (Table 2A), Tunisia (Table 2B), 
French Cameroon (Table 2C), and Vietnam (Table 2D). Figure 1 shows the income share of the 
top 1% in Algeria and Tunisia, compared to France, and in South Africa and India compared to 
the United Kingdom, between 1920 and 1960.  In Algeria, this share starts from a very high 22% 
in 1932, then drops steadily throughout the 1930s, and drops further during WWII, like in 
France. It stabilizes at around 15% in the 1950s. Measured between 1946 and 1956, the figures 
for Tunisia are slightly lower but close, at around 14%.  
 
The inequality levels in Algeria in the early 1930s appear to be among the highest recorded in 
WID.world.30 Even if the available data do not allow for a precise estimate, this suggests a top 
10% income share of at least 60%, if not higher.31 As in many other countries, the Second World 
War resulted in a sharp and definitive fall of top shares. French North Africa overwhelmingly 
depended on the mainland economy for its exports, and the fall of France resulted in a deep 
recession. The arrival of Allied forces in 1943 and ensuing warfare in Tunisia further deepened 
the disruption of trade, and most likely accelerated capital losses.32 In contrast, South Africa 
suffered less of an impact, and benefitted from the price boom of mineral exports, gold in 
particular, in the late 1940s. Inequality peaked; however, in the 1950s top shares finally fell far 
below pre-war levels (Alvaredo and Atkinson 2010). In the late 1950s, the levels of income 
concentration in Algeria, Tunisia, and India were greater than apartheid South Africa.  
 
The set of top 0.1% shares depicted in Figure 2 includes figures for Vietnam between 1920 and 
1942, for French Cameroon in 1945, and for Zambia and Zimbabwe on the side of British 
colonies.33 In the 1920s, the top 0.1% share for Vietnam is estimated to be around 8%, a level 
that sits in the same range as France, the UK, or Zimbabwe. As Europeans in Vietnam make up 
around 0.1% of tax units, this share reflects the average income of Europeans compared to 
autochthons, at least until 1937, when rich autochthons became liable to the income tax. After 
this date, the dotted line in Figure 2 shows the top 0.1% share when only Europeans are 
considered; the difference remains minimal until 1940, when many more wealthy non-Europeans 
came to be counted. Europeans seem to have been relatively well protected from the deflation 
and economic collapse of the first half of the 1930s, so that their share in total income actually 
jumps upward to 12% before falling back to pre-crisis levels at the end of the decade. This 
increase in top shares is observed across all parts of Vietnam (see Figure 6 and Appendix Figure 
D2). This is striking, as historical accounts of the period describe the bankruptcies of several 
French firms in Indochina (Brocheux and Hémery 2001; Brocheux 2009). While income tax 
																																								 																				
30 See also the discussion in section 3 about tax deductions for family charges in Algeria, whose reintegration would 
put Algeria significantly above South Africa in the 1930s. 
31	 In 1932 France, the top 10% share is 2.9 times the top 1% share. Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps (2018, 
Appendix I) estimate the total income share of Europeans at 64% in 1925.	
32	In 1943, exports from the two colonies went down to less than 10% of their value in 1942. Cogneau, Dupraz and 
Mesplé-Somps (2018) estimate that GDP per capita decreased by around 20% between 1938 and 1945, both in 
Algeria and Tunisia. The estimate for France is a 25% decrease.	
33 Top 0.01% shares are shown in Appendix Figure D1. 
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tabulations indeed show a decrease in the average income of European taxpayers, in nominal 
terms and even in real terms (despite deflation), this decrease is much less pronounced than the 
fall of GDP in Bassino’s (2000) estimates. Poor Vietnamese rice producers may have suffered 
even more than European businesses from the collapse in rice prices and exports. The same 
explanation could hold for India where the top 0.1% share also increased significantly during the 
first half of the 1930s, although to a lesser extent. 
 
 
Figure 6. Top 0.1% income share in Cochinchina and Tonkin, 1920 to 1949 
 
Sources: Table 2A (Algeria) and authors’ calculations (Cochinchina and Tonkin). 
Notes: Due to the small number of taxpayers, the 0.1% income share cannot be computed for Annam (Center 
Vietnam). 
 
Data for Cochinchina (South-Vietnam) allow us to extend the top 0.1% estimation to 1949 
(Figure 6). In 1921, the top 0.1% share for this single colony is below that of the whole Vietnam 
(i.e. 6% against 8%), and is much lower than that of the poorer Tonkin (around 12%), which it 
remains so throughout the 1920s and 1930s.34 The share in Cochinchina then abruptly falls from 
around 8% in 1937-1940 to 2.1% in 1943, and stabilizes at around 4% between 1944 and 1949. 
The beginning of a drop is also observed for Tonkin in 1943. After 1943, the economy of 
Cochinchina collapsed. In March 1945, the Japanese army took hold of Saigon, and the Vietminh 
rebel forces entered into action; famine and epidemics spread, Europeans fled. Between 1939 and 
																																								 																				
34	These results are at odds with the low Gini coefficients from Milanovic (2018, p. 1033) where Cochinchina (36.8) 
appears more unequal than Tonkin (25.6) in 1929. The social tables and Gini coefficients are supposed to come from 
Merette (2013a), yet in her paper the Gini coefficients are higher and closer (39.0 and 38.6 respectively), even if they 
are just a little bit higher than the Gini coefficient of 35.6 for Vietnam in 2008 cited by Merette (2013a), after a few 
decades of socialism. Both authors provide little clue as to their calculations. Besides, in Milanovic (2018) 
Cochinchina’s GDP per capita is just 40% higher than in Tonkin, whereas in our data, Cochinchina is almost three 
times above, like in Merette (2013a, b), who also used Bassino’s (2000) estimates.	
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1945, the number of European taxpayers in Cochinchina fell by 30%, and not many came back; 
in 1949, they still counted for 28% less than the 1939 numbers. But the income of those who 
remained also fell. Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps (2018, Appendix II) show that the 
average real wage of European civil servants fell by 60% between 1925 and 1945, due to inflation; 
those civil servants represented more than one third of employed Europeans, even excluding 
army men. In colonial India, the top 0.1% share also fell during WWII, although much less so, 
from 7.5% in 1940 to less than 5% in 1945, in particular because India was less impacted by 
warfare; like in Vietnam, the share never went back to pre-war levels, neither before 
independence in 1947 nor even after. In contrast, and much like in South Africa, the top shares 
peaked in the late 1940s in Zambia and Zimbabwe, due to the mining boom; it is only in the 
1950s that they converged to the levels reached by the other colonies, and finally broke with the 
high pre-war levels. 
 
To summarize, colonies displayed higher levels of income concentration than the mainland. 
During the Great Depression, and in contrast to France or the United Kingdom, top income 
shares did not fall (Algeria, South Africa), and in some cases they even increased (Vietnam, India, 
Zimbabwe). After World War II, and once the impact of the boom in mineral prices had faded 
away in British Austral Africa, inequality stabilized to levels much lower than before, although 
still significantly higher than in the metropoles. 
 
Figure 7. Top 0.1% income share in French and British colonies and dominions 1945-1960	
 
Sources: Table 2A (Algeria), Table 2B (Tunisia), Table 2C (French Cameroon), Table 2D (Indochina), 
Alvaredo and Atkinson, 2010 (South Africa), Atkinson 2014, 2015a, b, c (Ghana, Malawi, Tanganyika, 
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia). 
 
While inequality was higher in colonies, this does not mean that top-income earners were as rich 
as their mainland counterparts (i.e. in the same overall top quantile). The two North African 
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colonies were four to five times poorer than France in the 1950s (Figure 5), yet their top 1% 
shares were “only” 50% higher, meaning that the average income of top 1% earners in the 
colonies was 30 to 50% that of the top 1% in the metropole. In other words, by 1955 the average 
income of the top 1% rather corresponded to the average income of the top 10% in France. In 
both 1921 and 1932 in Vietnam, the top 0.1% earned on average the mean income of the top 4% 
or 5% in France. The same was true of Cameroon in 1945. The South African elite were more 
affluent. In the 1950s, the average income in South Africa was half that of the UK at market 
exchange rates, and the mean income the top 1% earners in South Africa was 75% of the mean 
income of the British top 1%.  
 
The comparison of top 0.1% shares (Figure 2) would also suggest that inequality was not 
systematically different in settlement colonies like Algeria or South Africa compared to colonies 
where the Europeans only represented a very small minority, like Vietnam, or India. In the 
second half of the 1930s, the top 0.1% share is between 7 and 8% in these four colonies. In the 
late 1950s, it lies between 4 and 5%. Figure 7 displays the top 0.1% shares for another set of 
British African colonies between 1945 and 1960. Once again, in the late 1950s, the highest top 
shares (above 5%) are those of Kenya, Tanganyika and Zimbabwe, while the lowest shares 
(below 4%) are those of Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa. It is hard to discern any patterns 
linked to the presence of Europeans.  
 
To shed more light on the comparison of top-income earners, both between colonies and the 
metropoles and within colonies, we must dig further into the composition of these groups in 
terms of citizenship and ethnicity. 
 
Let us more formally portray how Europeans and autochthons enter the colonies’ income 





Where 𝑦! and 𝑦 reflect, respectively, the average incomes of the top p% richest and the colony 
average income. The average income 𝑦 combines the average income of Europeans (𝑦!) and of 
autochthons (𝑦!) 
𝑦 = 𝜀𝑦! + (1− 𝜀)𝑦! = 𝜀 + (1− 𝜀)/𝛿 𝑦! (2) 
 
where 𝜀 is the share of Europeans in the total population of tax units, and 𝛿 is the Europeans to 
autochthons average income ratio, which our data cannot not capture because it focuses on top 
income earners. Likewise, the average income 𝑦! combines the average income of Europeans and 
of autochthons 
𝑦! = 𝜀!𝑦!! + (1− 𝜀!)𝑦!! = 𝜀! + (1− 𝜀!)/𝛿! 𝑦!! (3) 
 
where 𝜀! is the share of Europeans in the top p%. If p is small, we can expect 𝛿! to be close to 1, 
as rich autochthons and Europeans gathered at the top of the income distribution should not 
differ too much in terms of average income. By knowing the ethnic composition of the top p%, 
i.e. of 𝜀!, we can find out to which top q% among Europeans it corresponds to 
𝑞 = 𝑝. 𝜀!/𝜀 (4) 
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Where 𝑦!!! is the average income of the top q% Europeans among Europeans, equal to 𝑦!! by 
definition. 𝑆!! can only be known when we have separate income tax tabulations for Europeans, 
and when we can make a safe calculation of the average income of Europeans, like in Cameroon 
and Vietnam (see next section). 
 




𝜀! + 1− 𝜀! /𝛿!
𝜀 + 1− 𝜀 /𝛿 . 𝑆!
!   (6) 
The top p% share is the product of 𝑆!! , which measures inequality among Europeans in the 
colony, and of a first term that combines the between-group inequality (𝛿), and the inequality 
among non-Europeans. When 𝜀! = 1 the European and autochthon distributions do not overlap 
at the top, either because autochthons are not liable (their incomes are not reported, as in 
Vietnam before 1937), or else because the richest autochthons are too poor to enter the top p% 
(as in Cameroon or South Africa as we will see). 
 
The next sub-section looks for autochthons at the top of the colonial income distributions. Sub-
section 5.3 then analyzes the inequality among Europeans, within colonies, and between the 







Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01%
1932 22.2 15.4 7.0 4.9 1.8
1933 22.4 15.4 7.1 4.5 1.7
1934 19.9 14.6 6.5 4.4 1.6
1935 17.3 12.4 5.3 3.6 1.3
1936 18.3 13.3 6.0 4.1 1.6
1937 19.8 14.1 5.9 4.0 1.5
1938 19.8 14.7 7.1 4.9 1.6
1939 18.8 14.0 6.8 4.7 1.6
1940 21.5 16.4 8.2 5.5 1.7





1946 17.9 13.1 6.2 4.6 2.2
1947 16.6 12.1 5.8 4.2 2.1
1948 17.2 12.8 6.5 4.9 3.3
1949 15.7 11.1 5.3 3.9 2.1
1950 13.9 10.3 4.2 2.9 1.3
1951 15.0 10.8 4.5 3.1 1.1
1952 16.2 10.8 4.2 2.8 1.1
1953 15.0 10.9 4.3 2.9 1.1
1954 15.2 9.9 3.7 2.7 1.2
1955 16.3 10.7 4.3 3.3 1.3
1956
1957 17.0 11.7 5.1 3.7 2.1
Table 2A. Algeria. Shares of income of top groups 1932-1957
per cent
Among total (adult) population
Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01%
1946 13.1 9.5 4.4 3.1 1.3 31.3 22.8 10.2 7.2 3.0 1.9 0.7 2.8 2.1 1.0
1947 13.5 9.4 4.1 2.9 1.3 31.9 22.0 9.2 6.3 2.6 1.7 0.8 6.0 3.1 2.3 1.2




1952 14.5 10.4 4.6 3.2 1.3 34.6 24.8 11.0 7.7 3.1 2.1 1.3 5.6 2.6 1.8 0.8
1953 14.1 10.0 4.1 2.8 1.1 32.9 23.4 9.8 6.6 2.5 1.7 0.9 6.0 2.7 1.8 0.7
1954 14.1 9.9 4.1 2.7 1.0 33.0 23.2 9.6 6.5 2.5 1.6 0.9 5.7 2.6 1.8 0.6
1955 15.0 10.4 4.2 2.8 1.1 34.5 23.9 9.6 6.4 2.5 1.7 1.0 9.0 6.5 3.0 2.0 0.8
1956 13.5 9.6 4.0 2.7 1.0 30.9 22.1 9.2 6.2 2.4 1.6 0.9 8.1 5.9 2.7 1.8 0.7
Table 2B. Tunisia. Shares of income of top groups 1946-1956








5.2 Were there non-Europeans among the rich? 
 
One unsurprising characteristic of the concentration of income in territories under colonial rule is 
that most members of the top groups were Europeans. In Kenya and Tanganyika in 1949, 
Atkinson (2014) shows that Europeans made up 73 and 74% of taxpayers, respectively. The 
remaining fraction was not necessarily composed of Africans, for these colonies also had 
significant Asian, and in particular Indian, minorities. The relatively large size of the Indian 
community also explains why Europeans only made up 50% of taxpayers in Uganda in 1949. In 
Ghana, in 1951, and Nigeria in 1957, the shares of Europeans reached 70 and 79%, respectively, 
while the shares of Africans were 18% and 14%, the rest being from India or the Middle East 
(Atkinson 2015a). Furthermore, the proportion of Europeans in the upper range of the income 
distribution (𝜀! in the notations introduced above) is often likely to surpass the fraction of 
Europeans in the taxpaying population as a whole. Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010) show that in 
South Africa in the late 1950s, when the breakdown of taxpayers by race becomes available, the 
Top 0.5% Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 50% Top 25% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%
1945 11.1 8.5 5.9 2.2 79.8 53.6 30.9 20.2 7.1
Among total (adult) population Among Europeans
Table 2C. Cameroon. Shares of income of top groups 1945
per cent
Top 0.1% Top 0.05% Top 0.01% Top 75% Top 50% Top 25% Top 10% Top 5% Top 1%





1926 8.8 6.2 2.5 89.5 73.2 49.3 29.0 20.0 8.5
1927 8.2 5.8 2.3 89.5 73.4 49.5 29.2 19.9 9.0
1928 9.1 6.3 2.5 89.7 72.7 48.6 28.6 19.5 8.7
1929 9.2 6.3 2.4 89.7 73.0 48.2 27.7 18.8 8.3
1930 10.6 7.3 2.7 89.9 73.5 48.4 27.1 17.8 7.7
1931 12.3 8.5 3.1 90.6 73.8 48.4 27.0 17.7 7.3
1932 12.9 8.9 3.3 90.4 73.6 48.3 27.0 17.7 5.7
1933 13.2 9.2 3.4 90.5 73.9 48.8 27.5 18.3 7.7
1934 13.1 9.1 3.4 90.1 73.3 48.2 27.1 18.0 7.4
1935 11.5 8.1 2.9 89.6 73.5 48.3 26.9 17.6 6.9
1936
1937 9.5 7.1 2.9 79.6 56.0 32.6 22.1 8.8
1938 8.3 6.2 2.6 79.9 57.5 34.7 23.5 10.1
1939 8.3 6.2 2.7 80.0 58.4 36.1 24.6 11.6
1940 9.8 7.8 3.5 90.8 69.0 44.5 31.7 12.4
1941
1942 5.2 4.4 2.0 89.6 68.3 42.2 29.0 11.4
Among total (adult) population Among Europeans
Table 2D. Vietnam. Shares of income of top groups 1921-1942
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fraction of non-whites is less than 2%, whether in the top 1% or the top 5% group. In contrast, 
in British India, top income earners were most likely to be Indian: Alvaredo, Bergeron and 
Cassan (2017) argue that, even if income tax data do not provide information on nationality or 
origin, the demographic weight of the European population was small enough to conclude that 
they could not possibly have represented more than 40% of the top 0.1% group in 1921. 
 
What about the French colonies? Here we can provide some insight for the cases of Tunisia, 
Cameroon, and Vietnam. The income tax in Algeria applied to all residents, but the breakdown 
according to ethnic origin is not available in the statistics. On average, Europeans in Tunisia 
usually made up over three quarters of taxpayers between 1946 and 1955.35 The fraction of 
Tunisian taxpayers went up from 20% in 1946 to 26% in 1955. At the turn of independence in 
1956, it increased considerably, reaching 38%, because some Europeans had left: the number of 
European taxpayers fell by 23% compared to 1955, and those who remained were renamed 
“Foreigners” in the statistics. Over the same period, the number of Tunisian taxpayers did not 
increase, but rather dropped by 9%. As shown in Figure 8, Tunisians earned between 14 and 27% 
of the top 0.1% group in each year (18% in 1956), the proportion being similar for the top 1%.36 
This suggests that, despite similar levels of inequality, the racial divide in the income dimension 
may have not been as acute in colonial Tunisia as it was in apartheid South Africa. However, a 
qualification is in order: Jews constituted a significant minority in Tunisia; they were concentrated 
in cities, were on average richer than Muslim Tunisians, and were not counted as Europeans in 
the statistics. In 1956, Tunisian Jews represented 18% of non-Muslims, so it would be 
demographically possible that they made up the majority of non-European top-income earners. 
Most of them also left the colony after independence, to France or to Israel. The income tax 
tabulation for 1956 adds the occupational distribution of taxpayers in each income bracket, 
separately for both Tunisians and Europeans (labeled as “Foreigners”). 61% of Tunisians 
belonging to the top 1% were salaried, 7% were self-employed professionals, 18% traders, and 
8% farmers. Europeans were even more likely to be wage earners, 70% were salaried and 7% 
were retired, only counted for 4% were professionals, 8% traders, and 7% farmers.37 In the top 
0.1% the occupational distribution changes dramatically, as fewer wage earners are found. 
Among Tunisians, the majority is made up of big traders (46%) and farmers (8%), 12% are self-
employed professionals, while only 23% are salaried. Among Europeans, salaried and retired 
individuals still make up 49% of the total, professionals 13%, traders 15% and farmers 16%.  
 
																																								 																				
35 See Appendix Table B1.B. 
36	To calculate the income share of each group, we look at the two income brackets that surround the top 0.1% or 
top 1% population share, compute the share of cumulated income earned by Europeans above each threshold, and 
linearly interpolate the share for the 0.1% or the 1%. See Appendix Figure D3 for the composition of the top 1% 
compared to South Africa. Within the top 0.1% or the top 1%, the average income gap between Europeans and 
non-Europeans, i.e. δ!.! or δ!.! in the notations introduced above, is not far from 1: in 1946 δ!.!=0.86 and δ!=0.90, 
and in 1955 δ!.!=1.03 and δ!=0.98.	
37	This is the occupational distribution after independence, when some Europeans had already left. The tabulation 
for 1955 also provides the occupational distribution of taxpayers, although not broken down by income level. It 
seems that it is mostly wage-earners who left first, for instance civil servants sent back to the metropole, but also a 
few professionals, like physicians or lawyers. In North Africa, only a small minority (less than 15%) of French 
salaried workers were in the public sector, even if the French made up around 60% of all civil servants (Cogneau, 




In 1945 in Cameroon, due to the existence of a means-tested lump-sum tax targeting rich 
autochthons, Africans made up 89% of registered taxpayers. However, their income distribution 
overlaps very little with that of Europeans. Out of 9,967 African taxpayers, only 22 had incomes 
above the minimum threshold for Europeans (60,000 francs). This means that Africans 
represented a negligible share of the top 0.1%, like in South Africa, even if they made up the 
great majority of the top 0.5% or 1%.  
 
Figure 8. The ethnic composition of the top 0.1% income share in Tunisia and 
Cochinchina 
 
Tunisia     Cochinchina 
Sources: Table 2B and author’s calculations. 
 
Following 1937, the gradual introduction of the progressive income tax in Indochina meant that 
certain non-Europeans became liable. In 1938 in Annam, this extension of liability was restricted 
to Asian minorities (Chinese and others); published statistics do not include a breakdown by 
ethnicity; however the total number of taxpayers increases by 65% between 1937 and 1942. In 
1940 in Tonkin, a few Chinese and other Asians appear separately in the income tax tabulations, 
and their number increases in the top 0.1%, from 5% of tax units in 1940 to 13% in 1943. As 
they were relatively rich (i.e. 𝛿!.! is below 1, in the notations introduced above), they received an 
even larger share of the income pie of the top 0.1%, growing from 9% in 1940 to 22% in 1943. 
In Cochinchina after 1937, Indochinese also became liable. While Cochinchina counted only for 
one fifth of Vietnam in terms of population, it was by far the richest region, with twice the 
average income of Vietnam (Bassino 2000, Merette 2013a). It was home to over 40% of the 
Europeans in Indochina before WWII, and over 70% after the war. It also attracted many 
Chinese immigrants, whose number more than tripled between 1937 and 1949 (Amer 2010). As 
visible in the right-hand panel of Figure 8, the fraction of Europeans within the top 0.1% 
decreased from 70% in 1937 to 56% in 1940, with the gradual inclusion of more Indochinese, 
Chinese, and other Asian taxpayers. During WWII, even if the number of non-European 
taxpayers stopped growing, the share of European taxpayers continued to fall because their 
number decreased, and a greater proportion of those who remained declared incomes below the 
liability threshold. After 1944, the number of Chinese taxpayers boomed, yet the share of 
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Europeans in the top 0.1% recovered, from 52% in 1947 to 61% in 1949.38 Whereas rich 
Indochinese made up over 90% of non-Europeans at the beginning, it is the inflow of Chinese 
taxpayers from 1939 that drove up the non-Europeans’ share, given the impoverishment of the 
Vietnamese elite during the war. In 1940, the non-European taxpayers in the top 0.1% were 
composed of 63% of Indochinese and 37% of Chinese and other Asians. In 1949, the ordering 
of shares was reverted, as they were respectively 21% and 79%. There were more non-Europeans 
at the top in Vietnam than in Tunisia or Cameroon, though never as many as in British India, 
where they were a majority. Furthermore, as was potentially the case with Jews in Tunisia, after 
WWII it was mainly the prosperous Chinese diaspora that would have been able to compete with 
Europeans. In contrast with Jews, however, not all Chinese taxpayers were, strictly speaking, 
autochthons, as some of them were new migrants. But unlike Jews, they did not leave after 
independence. 
 
Can we calculate inequality among non-Europeans? We would need information of their income 
total, or equivalently, of the income of Europeans. For Tunisia, Amin (1966, 1970) provides an 
estimate of the income share of Muslims in the 1950s. By that time, according to Amin, the 
average European (mainly French and Italian) earned about eight times the average income of 
Tunisian Muslims. If we additionally assume that Jews had the same average income as 
Europeans, we can compute the income total for the population of Tunisian autochthons 
(Muslims and Jews together). Under these two assumptions, Table 2B suggests that inequality 
among Tunisians was not very high, with the top 1% reaching 8-9% in 1955-56, and the top 0.1% 
sitting somewhere between 2% and 3% (see the left-hand panel of Appendix Figure D5). These 
figures are close to the ones obtained for the income distribution of Europeans (also shown in 
Table 2B), and are also close to the income distribution of mainland France. The higher level of 
overall inequality in Tunisia is then essentially due to the gap in average income between 
Europeans and non-Europeans. 
 
In Cameroon in 1945, the 1,203 European taxpayers represent 70% of our estimated population 
control total.39 The remaining 30% must earn incomes below the liability threshold, hence 
representing the poorest 30%. If we assume that the income ratio between these two groups is 
the same as mainland France in 1945, we get an estimate of the total income of Europeans. We 
obtain moderate inequality figures among Europeans, and even lower among autochthons. The 
concentration figures among Europeans is very similar to that of France, the share of the top 1% 
richest being 7.1% versus 7.5% in the metropole. As for autochthons, registered taxpayers make 
up 0.8% of the total of tax units getting 4.9% of the estimated non-European income. In any 
case, this would put the extrapolated top 1% far below 6%. We also get a 1.2% share for the top 
0.1%, again much lower than the share for France (2%).  
 
In Vietnam, all European tax units are in principle recorded, as well as their taxable income. We 
thus just use the reported figures alone to individually calculate the top shares for Europeans and 
for non-Europeans. For the latter, this is only possible when they are supposed to be taxed, i.e. 
																																								 																				
38	Data for Europeans in 1948 is incomplete and cannot be used.	
39	Obtained again as 60% of the 15+ population, assuming a 75% share for this age group, applied to the figure of 
3,600 Europeans reported in the Statistical Abstract for 1936-1945.		
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only for Cochinchina after 1937.40 Before WWII, we find rather high top shares, especially in 
1940 when the number of non-European taxpayers reached a local maximum (before an 
additional inflow of Chinese migrants during the 1940s, see above). The top 0.01% share is then 
as high as 2%, compared to 1.7% in France during the same year, and 1.7% as well in Algeria 
wherea Europeans and non-Europeans are taken together (see right-hand panel of Appendix 
Figure D4, and compare with Appendix Figure D1).  This number is, however, lower than the 
estimates for India by Alvaredo, Bergeron and Cassan (2017) which lie above 2.5% across most 
of the 1930s and above 3% in 1940; although these estimates include a minority of rich 
Europeans. After WWII, in the years 1947 and 1949, the non-European income distribution in 
Cochinchina becomes much more equal, even more so than among Tunisians in Tunisia.  
 
Caution around estimates of top shares among non-Europeans is certainly warranted, given the 
assumptions involved in estimating the income total. There may also be concerns around the 
enforcement of the tax.41 In the case of Cochinchina, another layer of uncertainty stems from the 
additional assumptions needed to estimate the missing totals for the taxable income of both 
Europeans and non-Europeans, as only the sum of the two is available (see section 3 and 
Appendix A1.F). It seems safe, however, to conclude that inequality among autochthons was not 
very high during the post-WWII period, and was probably higher in the 1930s. Given the under-
representation of autochthons in the top percentiles, even a significant fall in autochtons’ within-




5.3 European expatriates and settlers 
 
If a few autochthons or non-Europeans could compete with European expatriates or settlers in 
terms of income, it remains that the latter represented the majority of top-income earners. Better 
understanding how European top incomes were formed is therefore important to analyzing 
cross-country differences in top shares, as well as their evolution over time. As already 
underlined, the number of Europeans varied greatly across colonies. 
 
In the colonies where there were fewer European expatriates, such as Cameroon or Vietnam, the 
majority formed part of the top 0.1%, whereas in the colonies where settlers resided in greater 
numbers, like in Algeria, Tunisia, or South Africa, those found in the top 1% or top 0.1% were 
much more exclusive than the wider European population. For this reason, we would expect the 
top shares to be higher in settlement colonies. As already mentioned, this is not what we found. 
Two factors counterbalance this selection effect. First, settlement colonies are richer. Even 
before colonization, North Africa was already wealthier and more urbanized due to its secular 
inclusion in the Mediterranean economy. Settlement regions, from North Africa to the Cape 
																																								 																				
40	We discuss the income distribution among Europeans, for the whole Vietnam, in the next section.	
41	This said, tax compliance under colonial rule might be better than most would expect. This has been shown in 
Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-Somps (2018) in the case of the capitation tax in French West Africa. The fact that the 
massive inflow of Chinese migrants in the 1940s is reflected in the tabulations is another testimony of the fact that 
the colonial administration was able to identify liable taxpayers, even when recently arrived in the territory.	
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Colony, through the Kenyan highlands, offered favorable health conditions and opportunities to 
develop European-like agriculture. 
 
 
Figure 9. The top 0.1% income share and settlement patterns 
 
Source: Authors' data; Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010) and Atkinson (2014) for British colonies. 
Notes: Both the availability of the top 0.1% share and of an estimate of the European population commanded 
the selection of the analysis sample. It is composed of colonies observed in 1921 (Vietnam), 1932 (Algeria, 
Tunisia, Vietnam, South Africa and Zimbabwe), between 1945 and 1951 (Algeria, Tunisia, Cameroon, Vietnam, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Tanganyika, Uganda and India), and in 1955 
(Algeria, Tunisia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia). The number of British tax units in India is not 
precisely known, so we took the upper bound of 0.04% mentioned by Alvaredo, Bergeron and Cassan (2017). 
Black dots represent the top 0.1% share, while the black line is the slope of a simple linear regression of the 
logarithm of the top 0.1% share on the logarithm of the share of Europeans. Blue dots and red dots indicate, 
respectively, the ratio of the top 0.1% average income to the average income of the metropole, and the ratio of 
the average income of the metropole to the average income of the colony. Blue and red lines represent the 
slope of a log-log regression on the share of Europeans; the slope of the black line is the sum of the two slopes 
of opposite sign. 
 
Figure 9 uses a subsample of country-years to look at the relationship between inequality levels 
and settlement patterns. The top 0.1% share can be decomposed as the product of two elements: 
the ratio of the top 0.1% average income to the mainland average income, and the ratio of the 
mainland average income to the average income of the colony. As shown in the logarithmic 
scales that transform this product into a sum, the two elements co-vary with the share of 
Europeans in the population, with slopes of equal magnitude and opposite signs. It is indeed the 
case that the top 0.1% is richer in settlement colonies, yet the bigger wealth of these colonies 
compensates for this advantage, so that in the end the relationship between the top share and the 




A second factor contributes to the flattening of this relationship. Compared to the metropole, 
expatriates also formed a more select group than settlers. European incomes were not randomly 
drawn from the overall income distribution of the metropole; in particular the incomes of 
expatriates in non-settler colonies were more often drawn from the upper parts of this 
distribution. The average European settler was closer to the average French in France or the 
average British in the UK, whereas expatriates in non-settler colonies were more likely to be high-
rank civil servants or adventurous businessmen. Occupation-wise, the North African settler 
population indeed resembled like a “small France”. According to the 1948 population census in 
Algeria, among the 331,595 non-Muslims who were economically active, two thirds (219,714) 
were classified as blue collars or low-ranking white collar workers (ouvriers, employés, cadres 
inférieurs). In the social table established by Samir Amin (1966, 1970) for Algeria and Tunisia in 
1955, blue collars and low-ranking white collars workers accounted for 50% of the workforce in 
Algeria, and 46% in Tunisia, while small business managers and middle-rank white collars 
represented 33 and 38% respectively.42 The 1937 census of Europeans in Indochina 
unfortunately does not provide much detail on occupational ranks and skills, although it is 
obvious that low rank occupations were largely missing. Civil servants made 40% of the 9,730 
employed civilians, 12% were professionals (profession libérale) and 15% were in trade (commerce). In 
Cameroon in 1938, one third of the 1,944 male Europeans were civil servants, another third were 
traders (commerçants), 10% ran plantations (planteurs), and another 10% were missionaries. 
 
More formally, getting back to the notations introduced in sub-section 5.1, we write the average 
income (𝑦!!!) of the top q% Europeans as a factor 𝜃!  of the average income (𝑦!!) of the top q% 
in the metropole: 
𝑦!!!  = 𝜃! .𝑦!! (7) 
 
We are interested in computing 𝜃! , with for instance q = 5%. In the cases of Tunisia, Cameroon 
and Vietnam, separate tabulations for Europeans allow us to directly compute 𝑦!!! .  
 
																																								 																				
42 See Appendix Table C1. 
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Table 3. Top 5% Europeans 
 
Source: Authors' data; Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010) and Atkinson (2014) for British colonies. 
Notes: Within each decade, countries are ordered according to the share (𝜀) of European tax units in the 
population, reported in column I. We estimated the average income of the top 5% richest Europeans. In the 
cases of Tunisia, Cameroon and Vietnam, we used the separate tabulations of Europeans. In the cases of 
Algeria and of British colonies, tabulations do not break down taxpayers by citizenship or ethnicity; for them, 
we make an assumption on the proportion of Europeans at the top of the income distribution (𝜀!), reported in 
column II. The top 5% Europeans is then matched with the top percentile p (= 5. 𝜀/𝜀!) of total population, 
reported in column III. For Algeria, we assumed that the top of the income distribution was composed of 
(𝜀!=) 90% of Europeans. For South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, we assumed that Europeans made 98% of 
top taxpayers, like in 1956 in South Africa. For other British colonies, we used the share of Europeans in 
taxpayers given in Atkinson (2014, 2015a) for the years around to 1948. We additionally assumed that there was 
no difference in average income between Europeans and non-Europeans within the top p, i.e. 𝛿! = 1, 
or 𝑦!! = 𝑦!!; given that 𝜀! is large this assumption is innocuous (estimates of 𝛿!.! for Tunisia are 0.86 in 1946 
and 1.03 in 1955). Then we estimate the average income 𝑦! using Pareto interpolations. Column IV reports the 
ratio of the average income of the top 5% Europeans to the e average income of the top 5% income-earners in 
the metropole. The top 5% income shares for France and United-Kingdom are from WID.world. For the 
United Kingdom, the top 5% share in 1932 is interpolated at 30.2% using figures for 1919 and 1937, and the 
top 5% share in 1955 is extrapolated at 21.0% using figures for 1954 and 1959.  
ε εp =5.ε/εp θ5
(%) (%) (%) (ratio)
I II III IV
1932
South Africa 1932 23.2 98.0 1.182 1.12
Algeria (North) 1932 15.7 90.0 0.873 1.13
Vietnam 1932 0.13 not needed 0.0065 3.05
1940s
South Africa 1949 20.6 98.0 1.051 1.74
Algeria 1946 13.5 90.0 0.748 1.19
Tunisia 1946 8.9 not needed 0.443 0.85
Zimbabwe 1949 5.5 98.0 0.280 2.89
Zambia 1949 1.9 98.0 0.099 1.94
Kenya 1948 0.66 73.2 0.045 2.15
French Cameroon 1945 0.14 not needed 0.0071 2.57
Vietnam 1942 0.12 not needed 0.0060 2.02
Ghana 1951 0.12 70.3 0.0086 3.70
Uganda 1948 0.08 49.6 0.0085 2.52
1955
South Africa 1955 20.3 98.0 1.036 1.64
Algeria 1955 12.7 90.0 0.703 0.80
Tunisia 1955 8.0 100.0 0.399 0.74
Zimbabwe 1955 6.6 98.0 0.338 2.14















In the other cases, we make assumptions about 𝜀! for sufficiently low top p percentiles (above 
1.5%), and, for a given q, compute 𝑦! at 𝑝 = 𝑞. 𝜀/𝜀!, by inverting equation (5) above. We also 
assume 𝛿! = 1, i.e. that at the top of the income distribution the income gap between Europeans 
and autochthons is negligible (see also Table 3 footnote). Inverting equation (3) gets us from 𝑦! 
to 𝑦!! , which is by definition equal to  𝑦!!!. 
 
Table 3 column IV shows the estimates of the average income of the top 5% Europeans (𝑦!!!), 
expressed as a factor 𝜃! of the average income of the corresponding top 5% (𝑦!!) in the 
metropole. Among the French colonies, European top income earners systematically earn less in 
settlement colonies. In 1932, the top 5% of Europeans in Vietnam earn three times the average 
income of the top 5% in France, while the top 5% in Algeria only earn 13% more. In 1945-46, 
the top 5% of Europeans in Cameroon earn 2.5 times the metropole’s top 5% average income, 
while the top 5% in Algeria earn only 19% more and in Tunisia 15% less. After WWII, the rich 
settlers in North Africa lost some ground compared to the metropole. In 1955, those in Algeria 
and Tunisia earned 20% and 26% less than the top 5% in France, respectively. In contrast, the 
top rich settlers in South Africa increased their advantage as in 1955 they were earning 64% more 
than the top 5% average income in the UK, compared to only 12% in 1932. According to 
Maddison’s (2003) estimates of GDP per capita, the average income in the UK was always higher 
than in France by 30% in 1932, 50% in 1948 and 27% in 1955, and top shares were close, so that 
the top rich settlers in South Africa were always richer than the top rich settlers in Algeria, even 
as early as in 1932. Yet, among British colonies, the top rich Europeans are also better off the 
lower their weight in the colony’s population. The richest white South Africans earned less than 
their counterparts in Zambia or Zimbabwe, and also in Kenya, Ghana or Uganda.43 
 
As argued above, the main reason for this regularity is the selection of skills and occupations. 
Another factor was the wage premium paid to attract European expatriates in less enjoyable or 
more remote non-settler colonies. In French colonies, civil servants received higher wage 
bonuses in Cameroon and Vietnam than in Algeria and Tunisia (Cogneau, Dupraz and Mesplé-
Somps, 2018). 
  
Within each colony, inequality among settlers or expatriates was similar to the inequality observed 
in the metropoles. We already mentioned that this was the case for Tunisia 1946 to 1956 (Table 
2B and Figure 10 below). In Cameroon in 1945, inequality among Europeans was lower than in 
mainland France (Table 2C). In Vietnam we also found that until 1937 the richest 10% 
Europeans earned 27-29% of the European income, i.e. a much lower share than in France at the 
time, and closer to the share that prevailed in post-WWII France or Tunisia. As soon as the 
general income tax starts was introduced in 1937 (see section 2), income concentration among 
Europeans seems to have caught up with the levels in mainland France levels (Figure 10). Yet the 
total amount of declared taxable income sees little change, and no discontinuity is observed in the 
top shares for the total population. As the general income tax introduced a liability threshold, a 
bit of income bunching can be observed below the threshold. However, correcting for this 
																																								 																				
43	 Even in India in 1932, the top 0.01% of the total population, which potentially included the top 25% of 
Europeans, earned 13 times more than the UK average income, i.e. they earned twice as much as our estimate for the 
top 5% in the metropole, and in 1947 this grew to 25.5 times more, which was more than twice the average income 
of the top 1%.	
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behavioral response only explains a small part of the difference. It seems that under the new tax, 
some taxpayers declare less in the middle of the distribution while others declare more at the top. 
As the general income tax is closer to the one that was implemented in the metropole, we 
conclude that inequality among Europeans was close to that of the mainland, as in Tunisia. 
 
Figure 10. Inequality among Europeans in Tunisia and Vietnam, and comparison with 
France 
 
Tunisia     Vietnam 
 
Sources: Table 2B (Tunisia), Table 2D (Indochina), and Piketty (2001, 2007) (France). 
 
Another way to capture the inequality and its impact among Europeans is to run the same 
computations as in Table 3 for even richer expatriates or settlers belonging to the top 0.5% rather 
than the top 5%. When referring to the standardized income ratio, i.e. the average income of the 
top 0.5% of Europeans to the average income of the top 0.5% in the metropole, the figures are 
quite close to those seen in Table 3. This reflects the similarity between the income distributions 
among Europeans in the colonies and the metropoles. In most cases, in comparison to Table 3, 
the “colonial advantage” is slightly attenuated at this level, meaning that the colonial income 
distribution is more equal at the very top than in the mainland. This can also be seen in the cases 
of Tunisia and Vietnam in Figure 10.  
 
5.4 Analyzing the fall in inequality before and after WWII 
 
The similarity between top income shares Europeans in the colonies and the mainland suggests 
that inequality in the colonies and in the metropoles co-moved, due of the integration of the 
labor and capital markets.44 In particular, the large reduction in inequality observed in France and 
the UK after WWII could account for the reduction observed also in the colonies between the 
1930s and the 1950s.  
																																								 																				
44	Allen, Murphy and Schneider (2014) make a similar argument on the integration of the labor markets of European 




Let us write the average income of Europeans as a factor 𝜃 of the average income in the 
metropole 
𝑦! = 𝜃.𝑦! (8) 











Where 𝑆!! is mainland’s top q% income share. The ratio 𝜃! 𝜃 captures the differences between 
the two European income distributions, the first in the colony, the second in the mainland. 




𝜀! + 1− 𝜀! /𝛿!






This expression directly relates the top share 𝑆! in the colony to that in the metropole (𝑆!!). The 
two main unknowns in this equation are 𝛿 and 𝜃, as in all cases except Vietnam and Cameroon, 
we do not observe the average income of Europeans.  
 
We make use of equation (10) to analyze the evolution of top income shares before and after 
WWII across the five colonies where this evolution is observed. At the top end of Table 4, we 
begin with Cochinchina between 1932 and 1949, because, as all European taxpayers are recorded, 
we can estimate every parameter and reach an exact decomposition. Between the two dates, the 
top 0.1% income share fell from 9.5 to 3.9 (column II and Figure 6). However, the fall of 
inequality in mainland France should not have played a role in this. Simultaneously, the share of 
Europeans in the population was more than halved, from 0.31 to 0.13%, as many of them left 
during WWII and the independence war that followed. Even though non-Europeans entered the 
top 0.1% after the introduction of the general income tax in 1937, this large outmigration ensured 
that Europeans in the top 0.1% became a less selective sample. They represented 46% of all 
expatriates versus 33% in 1932 (col. V), and the corresponding income shares in the mainland 
(𝑆!!) went from 73 to 79% (col. VI). Simulations (not shown) indicate that, combined, these 
changes would have led to a decrease in the top income share from 9.5 to 7.6, i.e. by only 20% of 
the initial level. The European income distribution also became somewhat more equal compared 
to mainland France, as the ratio 𝜃! 𝜃 went from 0.85 (=4.68/5.49) to 0.76 (=3.14/4.11), 
however this change can only explain a further 11% reduction in the top 0.1% income share, 
from 7.6 to 6.8 (col. XI). The bulk of the fall in inequality is thus explained by the reduction in 
the income gap between Europeans and autochthons, i.e. the fall of 𝛿 from 59.1 to 32.7 (col. X). 
The “between-groups” dimension dominates. However, as mentioned earlier, this reduction in 
the racial divide took place in a context of economic collapse, whereby Europeans’ incomes fell 
more than autochthons’ ones.  
 
The lower part of Table 4 considers the cases of the four other colonies: South Africa, Algeria, 
and Zimbabwe between 1932 and 1955, and Zambia between 1943 and 1955. In contrast to 
Cochinchina, the parameters 𝜀!, 𝛿!, and, most importantly, 𝜃 and 𝛿, cannot be estimated from 
the income tabulation data directly. The first two parameters can be quite confidently set at 
values close to 100% or 1. As with the estimations conducted for Table 3, we assume that 
Europeans made up 90% of top taxpayers in Algeria, and 98% in the three other British colonies; 
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and we set 𝛿! = 𝛿!.! = 1. As can be seen in Table 4 col. VIII, the estimates of  𝜃! (for q ranging 
between 1.48 and 7.58%, col. V) closely match the estimates of 𝜃! reported in Table 3 (for the 
top 5%). If we assume that the income distribution among Europeans is close enough to that of 
the metropole, we can set 𝜃 = 𝜃! , as is done in column IX. The data then allow us to estimate 
plausible values for 𝛿, in column X. In both South Africa and Algeria in 1932, the average 
European is found to earn seven times the average income of autochthons. In the two other 
British colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa, this income gap is much greater: 21 in Zimbabwe, and 28 
in Zambia, firstly because these two colonies are poorer, and secondly because the average 
European is more selected. Of course, these estimates of 𝛿 are strongly sensitive to the 
calibration of 𝜃. Depending on whether the European income distribution was either more 
(respectively, less) equal in the colonies than in the metropole, the average European would, 
respectively, be either richer or poorer, and, conversely, the income gap 𝛿 would be either larger 
or smaller. Column XI reports the prediction of the top income shares for the year 1955 under 
the two following assumptions: (i) the income gap 𝛿 between Europeans and autochthons 
remained the same as before WWII; (ii) inequality among Europeans shifted alongside like 
inequality in the metropole.  
 
The last column (XII) of the Table suggests that this prediction fits well with the figures 
observed in the cases of South Africa, Algeria, and Zimbabwe. The proportional difference 
between what is observed and predicted never exceeds 7% (South Africa); this small difference 
can be explained by a small discrepancy between inequality among Europeans and mainland 
inequality. Although a good fit is not evidence of causation, it nonetheless suggests that the fall of 
inequality in the colonies might have been driven by the same factors as the fall of inequality in 
France (Algeria) or in the United-Kingdom (South Africa and Zimbabwe), and more generally in 
Europe.  
 
The last case of Zambia 1943-1955 does not quite fit with the rest of the model, like 
Cochinchina. The income gap 𝛿 between Europeans and autochthons must have sharply fallen 
during this period (possibly from 27.6 to 11.6, see col. X) and/or the inequality among European 
settlers must have been more heavily reduced than in the UK (i.e. 𝜃! 𝜃 possibly from 1 to 0.58, 
col. XI). It is likely that an intermediate combination of the two took place, although it is 
impossible to identify their respective weight. The expansion of copper mining from the 1930s, 
might well have paved the way to some income convergence between Europeans and 
autochthons. The famous copper strike of 1935, African labor unionization in 1949, and another 
successful copper strike in 1952, forced mining companies and colonial authorities to concede 
higher wages and benefits to African workers (Butler 2007). The copper price boom of 1953 
(Korea War) should also have facilitated convergence. In the meantime, the population of 
European settlers also boomed, and the share of European tax units almost tripled, from 1.3% in 
1943 to 3.3% in 1955. This large inflow of new settlers could have resulted in a strong reduction 
in inequality among Europeans, even stronger than in the metropole. This demographic shock 
ensured that Europeans in the top 0.1% were the richest 3% in 1955, versus 8% in 1932 (column 
V); at both points, these top rich settlers earned 1.7 to 1.9 the income of their mainland 
counterparts (column VIII). Perhaps the remaining 92% were less advantaged or less exclusive in 
1932 (the income gap 𝛿 would then have been lower than the estimate in column X) while the 
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newcomers of 1955 fared better, being attracted by the new profit opportunities opened by the 
copper economy. 
 
Given the over-representation of Europeans in the top percentiles, the fall in within-group 
inequality, mirroring the inequality reduction in Europe, should have played a very important role 
in the fall of the colonial top income shares after WWII. In the settlement colonies of South 
Africa, Algeria, and Zimbabwe, the decline in top income shares had little to do with a reduction 
in the between-groups inequality, i.e. of the gap in average incomes between Europeans and 
autochthons. Although this cannot be tested, it is plausible that Tunisia followed the same model. 
However, in other cases such as Vietnam or Zambia, idiosyncratic shocks like the independence 
war or the copper boom impacted the between-group component, while the population of 




Using income tax tabulations from French administrative archives, we produce estimates of 
income concentration for four French colonies between 1920 and 1957. Drawing from previous 
work, we were able to compare these French colonies with the British Empire in Africa, and 
Asia, but also the two metropoles, France and the United Kingdom. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
income inequality in the French and British empires of the 20th century was very high, even above 
that of mainland France or United Kingdom. In the mid-1930s, the share of the top 1% was 
around 20% in Algeria and 15% in France. In the aftermath of World War II, both the 
metropoles and colonies experienced a significant drop in concentration; yet in the 1950s, the top 
shares stabilized at a higher level than the metropoles, ranging from 13 to 15% for the top 1%, 
and from 3 to 6% for the top 0.1%. 
 
European expatriates and settlers comprised an overwhelming majority of top income recipients 
in the French Empire and in the British colonies of Africa; this differs from the case of India, 
where British and Indians cohabited at the top 0.1%. Prosperous Tunisians made up one fifth of 
the top-rich in the 1950s. In terms of non-Europeans, Tunisian Jews represented another 
significant minority, so that the divide between non-Muslims and Muslims may well have been no 
less salient than the divide between Whites and Blacks in South Africa or in Cameroon. In 
Southern Vietnam (Cochinchina) in the late 1930s and 1940s, locals constituted a greater 
proportion of the top than in Tunisia, although not as great as as in British India; another 
minority, the Chinese, was also well represented among the richest. The available data provide 
limited insights into the income concentration between the non-Europeans, though it suggests it 
was lower in Tunisia or Cameroon than in Vietnam. 
 
The top shares in settlement colonies do not look higher than in colonies where Europeans were 
a smaller minority. On the one hand, where Europeans populations were higher, top income 
settlers represented a smaller and relatively richer, fraction of all Europeans. On the other hand, 
settlement colonies were wealthier. Furthermore, the population of European settlers was much 
closer to the mainland averages in terms of occupation or skill, whereas European expatriates in 
non-settler colonies were more exclusive and received higher wage bonuses or risk premiums. 
The richest Europeans were better off outside settlement colonies; this is true of both French 
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and British territories, even if the rich white South Africans always fared better than the rich 
French settlers in Algeria or Tunisia. In the cases we were able to analyze, inequality among 
Europeans in the colonial territories was close to, or sometimes even lower than, that of the 
corresponding mainland. For Europeans, the integration of labor and capital markets between 
the mainland and its colonies meant that incomes were partly determined in France or in the UK. 
Leaving aside idiosyncratic shocks such as independence wars or mining booms, a significant part 
of the decrease in the top shares following World War II can thus be linked to the decrease in 
inequality in Europe, that is, to global forces, rather than to a reduction of the income gap 
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Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Algérie. Nouvelle Série. Onzième 
Volume. 1959.









1946 Régence de Tunis. Protectorat Français. Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement Tunisien. Service Tunisien des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie. Année 1948. p. 134.
1947 Régence de Tunis. Protectorat Français. Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement Tunisien. Service Tunisien des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie. Année 1948. p. 134.




1952 Royaume de Tunis. Protectorat Français. Présidence du Conseil. Service Tunisien des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie 1953. Nouvelle série. Sixième volume. p. 129.
1953 Royaume de Tunis. Protectorat Français. Présidence du Conseil. Service Tunisien des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie 1954. Édition 1955.  p. 121.
1954 Royaume de Tunisie. Présidence du Conseil. Service Tunisien des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie 1955. Édition 1956. p. 130.
1955 République Tunisienne. Secrétariat d'État à la Présidence. Sous-Secrétariat d'État au Plan. Service des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie 1956. Édition 1957. p. 146.
1956 République Tunisienne. Secrétariat d'État à la Présidence. Sous-Secrétariat d'État au Plan. Service des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie 1957-1958. p. 159.
Table A1.B. Tunisia. Data sources of the distribution of income from the income tax
1945 Ministère de la France d'Outre Mer. Service Colonial des Statistiques. Annuaire Statistique du Cameroun. Volume I. 1936-1945.





Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. 
Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Premier Volume. Recueil de Statistiques relatives aux années 1913 à 1922. 
Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient-Éditeur. Hanoi 1927.
1921
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. 
Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Premier Volume. Recueil de Statistiques relatives aux années 1913 à 1922. 
Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient-Éditeur. Hanoi 1927.
1922
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. 
Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Premier Volume. Recueil de Statistiques relatives aux années 1913 à 1922. 
Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient-Éditeur. Hanoi 1927.
1923
1924
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Inspection Générale des Mines et de l'Industrie. Service de la Statistique 
Générale de l'Indochine. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Deuxième Volume. 1923 à 1929. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1931.
1925
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Inspection Générale des Mines et de l'Industrie. Service de la Statistique 
Générale de l'Indochine. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Deuxième Volume. 1923 à 1929. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1931.
1926
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Inspection Générale des Mines et de l'Industrie. Service de la Statistique 
Générale de l'Indochine. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Deuxième Volume. 1923 à 1929. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1931.
1927
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Inspection Générale des Mines et de l'Industrie. Service de la Statistique 
Générale de l'Indochine. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Deuxième Volume. 1923 à 1929. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1931.
1928
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Inspection Générale des Mines et de l'Industrie. Service de la Statistique 
Générale de l'Indochine. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Deuxième Volume. 1923 à 1929. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1931.
1929
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Inspection Générale des Mines et de l'Industrie. Service de la Statistique 
Générale de l'Indochine. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Deuxième Volume. 1923 à 1929. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1931.
1930
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Inspection Générale des Mines et de l'Industrie. Service de la Statistique 
Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Troisième Volume. Recueil de Statistiques. 1930-1931. Imprimerie 
d'Exrême-Orient-Éditeur. Hanoi 1932.
1931
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques et Administratives. Bureau de la 
Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Quatrième Volume 1931-1932. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1933.
1932
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques et Administratives. Bureau de la 
Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Quatrième Volume 1931-1932. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1933.
1933
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques et Administratives. Bureau de la 
Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Quatrième Volume 1931-1932. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient. Hanoi 1933.
1934
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques et Administratives. Bureau de la 
Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Sixième Volume. 1934-1935-1936. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient-Éditeur. Hanoi 1937.
1935
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques et Administratives. Bureau de la 
Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Sixième Volume. 1934-1935-1936. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient-Éditeur. Hanoi 1937.
1936
Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Affaires Économiques et Administratives. Bureau de la 
Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Sixième Volume. 1934-1935-1936. Imprimerie d'Exrême-
Orient-Éditeur. Hanoi 1937.
1937 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Huitième Volume 1937-1938. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1938 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Huitième Volume 1937-1938. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1939 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Neuvième Volume 1939-1940. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1940 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Neuvième Volume 1939-1940. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1941 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Dixième Volume 1941-1942. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1942 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine. Dixième Volume 1941-1942. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1943 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine.Onzième Volume 1943-1946. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1944 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine.Onzième Volume 1943-1946. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1945 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine.Onzième Volume 1943-1946. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1946 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine.Douzième Volume 1947-1948. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1947 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine.Douzième Volume 1947-1948. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
1948 Gouvernement Général de l'Indochine. Direction des Services Économiques. Service de la Statistique Générale. Annuaire Statistique de l'Indochine.Douzième Volume 1947-1948. Imprimerie d'Exrême-Orient. Hanoi.
Vietnam
1949 Institut de la Statistique et des Études Économiques du Viêtnam. État du Viêtnam. Ministère de l'Économie Nationale. Annuaire Statistique du Viêtnam. Premier volume. 1949-1950. pp.274-275.
1950 Institut de la Statistique et des Études Économiques du Viêtnam. État du Viêtnam. Ministère de l'Économie Nationale. Annuaire Statistique du Viêtnam. Premier volume. 1949-1950. pp.274-275.
Table A1.D. Indochina. Data sources of the distribution of income from the income tax
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Table A1.E. Availability of tax tabulations, coverage, and reporting of taxable income 
 
 
A1.F. Imputation of missing taxable income 
Algeria 
1932-41: We estimate 𝑌! = 𝑁! 𝑦! + 0.3 𝑦!!! − 𝑦! , for k=0,…, K, while setting 𝑦! = 0 
and 𝑦!!! = 2𝑦! . 1946: We use mean incomes of 1947 (same brackets).  
Tunisia 
1956: Brackets are the same as in 1955 except the two last ones, until then we use mean incomes of 
1955. For the last but one we estimate 𝑌!!! = 𝑁!!! 𝑦! + 0.3 𝑦! − 𝑦!!! , and calibrate the last 
one so that the two merged display the same mean income as in 1955. 
Indochina 
Cochinch ina  
1920-21 & 1926-35: Income is capped in the last bracket; we use instead 1937 ratio to 𝑦! . 1937-39 & 
1944-45: Total income above 𝑦!(=3,600) is known. We write 𝑌! = 𝑁! 𝑦! + 𝛼 𝑦!!! − 𝑦!  for k=0, 
…, K, while setting  𝑦! = 0 and 𝑦!!! = 2𝑦! . 𝛼 is then calibrated to fit total income above 𝑦!. 1940 
& 1947: Total income is known (excepting non-Europeans below 𝑦!); in 1947, as it seems that the 
general lump-sum rebate (12,000 piasters) was discounted from the total, we make a correction and 
also adjust income brackets. Idem 1937-39. 1942-43: We import 𝛼 from 1940 and apply 𝑌! =
𝑁! 𝑦! + 𝛼 𝑦!!! − 𝑦! . 1949: We import 𝛼 from 1947 and apply 𝑌! = 𝑁! 𝑦! + 𝛼 𝑦!!! − 𝑦! , 
while also adjusting income brackets with the lump-sum rebate of 12,000 piasters. 
Tonkin 
1921: We use mean incomes of 1922 (same brackets). 1921-37: Income is capped in the last bracket, 
but not in 1938-39. We use instead 1938 ratio to 𝑦! . 1940-41: Total income is known (excepting non-
Europeans below 𝑦!). Idem Cochinchina 1940. 1942-43: For each bracket, we use 1941 (same 
brackets) mean income. 
Annam 
1922-37: Income is capped in the last bracket. We use instead 1938 ratio to 𝑦! . 1938-39: Idem 
Cochinchina 1937-39. 1940-41: Idem Cochinchina & Tonkin. 1942: Idem Tonkin.  
Cambodia  
1920-21: As brackets are the same as in 1923, we use 1923 mean incomes. 1923-36: Income is capped 
in the last bracket. We use instead (estimated) 1938 ratio to 𝑦! . 1936: We use mean incomes of 1935 
(same brackets). 1937-39: Idem Cochinchina. 1940-41: Idem Cochinchina & Tonkin. 1942-45: We 
import 𝛼 from 1941 and apply 𝑌! = 𝑁! 𝑦! + 𝛼 𝑦!!! − 𝑦! . 
Laos 
1938-39: Idem Cochinchina. 1940-42: We use mean incomes of 1939 (same brackets).  









Black : All taxpayers; dark grey: Only Europeans and Chinese;  light grey : Only Europeans; blank : no data









Black : Income totals for each income bracket; dark grey: Total amount of declared income is known; light grey : No income totals; blank : no data
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A2. Population of French colonies 
 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Algérie, various years. 
Annuaire Statistique de la Tunisie, various years. 
Ministère de la France d’Outre-Mer, 1947. Annuaire Statistique du Cameroun 1938-1945,volume I. 
Paris : Imprimerie Nationale. 
Annuaire Statistique de l’Indochine, various years. 
Banens, Maks. 2000. Vietnam: a reconstitution of its 20th century population history" in: Bassino, 
Giacometti, Odaka, Vietnam Economic History, Tokyo, Hitotsubashi University, pp 1-45. 
Cogneau, Denis, Yannick Dupraz, and Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2018. Fiscal Capacity and 
Dualism in Colonial States: The French Empire 1830-1962. PSE Working Paper N°2018-27. 
Frankema, Ewout and Morten Jerven. 2014. Writing History Backwards and Sideways: Towards a 
Consensus on African Population, 1850-present. Economic History Review. 67(4): 907-931. 
CICRED, 1974a. La population de l’Algérie.  
CICRED, 1974b. La population de la Tunisie. 
 
A3. National income of French colonies 
Cogneau, Denis, Yannick Dupraz, and Sandrine Mesplé-Somps, 2018. Fiscal Capacity and 
Dualism in Colonial States: The French Empire 1830-1962. PSE Working Paper N°2018-27. 
Amin, Samir. 1966. L’économie du Maghreb. Paris : Editions de Minuit.  
Statistique générale de l’Algérie, Tableaux de l’économie algérienne, 1958. 
Zarka, Claude, 1964. « L'économie tunisienne à l'heure de la planification impérative », in 
Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Paris : Editions du CNRS, 1964, pp. 207-241, Vol. 1 (940 p.). 
Direction des Affaires économiques et du Plan du ministère de la France d’outre-mer, 1955. 
"Essai de détermination du revenu national des principaux territoires d’outre-mer en 1947 et en 
1953", Paris. 
Bassino, Jean-Pascal, 2000. Preliminary estimates of Vietnam GDP 1800-1970: North-South 
economic divide in historical perspective. International research workshop on Asian historical 
statistics database, 7-8 January 2000. 
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A4. Legal sources about the income taxes in French colonies 
Alger ia 
République française, Gouvernement général de l’Algérie, 1928. « Circulaire relative à 
l’établissement des impôts sur les revenus (Circulaire n°102 du 30 avril 1928) ». Direction des 
services financiers, Service des contributions directes. Alger : Ancienne Maison Bastide-Jourdan 
et Jules Carbonel. 
République française, Gouvernement général de l’Algérie, 1935. « Recueil des textes 
réglementaires concernant l’assiette de l’impôt sur le revenu, en Algérie – Année 1935. »  Alger : 
Imprimeries « La Typo-Litho » et Jules Carbonel réunies. 
République française, Gouvernement général de l’Algérie, 1938. « Recueil des textes 
réglementaires concernant l’assiette de l’impôt sur le revenu, en Algérie – Année 1938. » Alger : 
Imprimerie Imbert. 
Gouvernement général de l’Algérie, 1947 and 1955. Code algérien des impôts directs et taxes assimilées. 
Imprimerie officielle du gouvernement général de l’Algérie. 
Délégation générale du gouvernement en Algérie, 1959. Code algérien des impôts directs et taxes 
assimilées, Imprimerie officielle. 
Tunis ia 
Louët, Th., 1927. Les impôts directs en Tunisie, Thèse pour le doctorat en droit de l’Université de 
Lyon, Tunis : Société Anonyme de l’Imprimerie Rapide. 
Régence de Tunis, Protectorat français, 1951. « Recueil de la législation relative aux impôts 
ressortissant de la direction des impôts personnels et sur les revenus en Tunisie ». Tunis : 
Imprimerie SAPI. 
Journal Officiel Tunisien, various dates, 1930-1957. 
Cameroon 
Journal Officiel du Cameroun, various dates, 1937-1941. 
Indochina 
To-Van Qua,  Secrétaire du gouvernement de la Cochinchina, 1924. « Répertoire des textes 
réglementant les divers impôts directs perçus en Cochinchina », Saigon : Imprimerie de l’Union 
Nguyen Van-Cua. 
To-Van Qua,  Secrétaire du gouvernement de la Cochinchina, 1930. « Répertoire des textes 
réglementant les divers impôts directs et taxes assimilées perçus en Cochinchina », Saigon : 
Imprimerie de l’Union Nguyen Van-Cua. 
Exposition coloniale internationale Paris 1931, Indochine Française, Section d’Administration 
générale, direction des finances, 1930. Les impôts directs en Indochine. Hanoi : Imprimerie d’Extrême-
Orient.  




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   

















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   

















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   

















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   

















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   

















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   








   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   








   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   








   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   








   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   
   






   
   






   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   








   







   







   
   






   
   


















   
   




   





   





   
   






   
   




   





   





   
   






   





   







   







   
   






   
   





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   










   






   





   





   











   










   




   





   

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   





   
   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   
   






   
   






















   
   





   
   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   














   
   





   
   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   
   






   
   
















   
   





   
   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   
   






   
   
















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   
   






   
   
















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   
   






   
   






















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   




















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   






















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   














   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   
   






   
   
























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   
   




   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   
   






   
   

























   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   






   




   






   
   





   
   
   
   




   
   




   





   
   















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   







   
   

















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   







   
   

















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   







   
   

















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   







   
   


















   
   





   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   







   
   


















   
   





   
   
   





   
   





   
   
   









   
   







   
   


































Appendix C. Additional tables 
Table C1. Samir Amin’s social table for Algeria and Tunisia for 1955 
 
  Algeria Tunisia 
 Number (000) 
Income per head 
Number (000) 
Income per head 
(000 francs) (000 francs) 
Muslims 
Farmers     
   Small  210 60 80 90 
   Medium  210 200 105 150 
   Large  50 560 45 450 
Agricultural workers        Permanent 100 100 25 120 
   Non-permanent 500 40-60 110 60-70 
Blue-collar workers 225 150 118 160 
White-collar workers 90 270 35 300 
Heads of small businesses & 
junior executives 135 270 53 300 
Senior executives & managers  7-8 1000-1500 2-3 1000-1500 
Non-muslims 
Farmers 33 2800 6 2800 
Blue-collar workers 88 400 16 400 
White-collar workers 80 530 21 530 
Heads of small businesses and 
junior executives 110 1150 31 1150 
Senior executives & managers 27 3000 8 3000 
Source: Samir Amin, 1970.  Pages 62 & 65 for rural households, pages 70-71 & 73-74 for urban.  
 





(francs) N (000) Income (billions) N (000) 	
Income (billions) N (000) Income (billions) 
0 to 20000 1666 54% 21 26% 348 23% 6,3 7% 2014 43% 27,3 15% 
20000 to 30000 605 73% 15 44% 222 37% 5,6 13% 827 61% 20,6 27% 
30000 to 40000 305 83% 11 57% 93 43% 3,3 16% 398 70% 14,3 35% 
40000 to 50000 177 89% 8 67% 117 51% 5,3 22% 294 76% 13,3 43% 
50000 to 60000 101 92% 6 74% 118 59% 6,5 28% 219 81% 12,5 50% 
60000 to 70000 69 94% 4 79% 55 62% 3,6 32% 124 84% 7,6 54% 
70000 to 80000 41 96% 2 82% 73 67% 5,5 38% 114 86% 7,5 58% 
80000 to 90000 27 96% 2 84% 46 70% 3,9 42% 73 88% 5,9 62% 

















Appendix D. Additional figures 
Figure D1. Top income 0.01% shares 
 
Sources: Table 2A (Algeria), Table 2B (Tunisia), Table 2C (French Cameroon), Table 2D (Indochina), and 
WID.world (France (Piketty, 2001, 2007), UK (Atkinson, 2005, 2007a), South Africa (Alvaredo and 
Atkinson, 2010). 
 
Figure D2. Top 0.01% shares in the five colonies of French Indochina 
 





Figure D3. Ethnic composition of the top 1% shares in Tunisia and South Africa 
 
	
Tunisia     South Africa 
 
Sources: Table 2B (Tunisia) and Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010). 
 
Figure D4. Top shares among autochthons in Tunisia and Cochinchina 
 
 
Tunisia      Cochinchina 
Sources: Table 2B (Tunisia) and Authors’ computations. 
	
 
